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Baby Jane Doe: Stating a Cause of Action
Against the Officious Intermeddler
By MICHAEL VITIELLO*
The birth of a seriously ill newborn presents parents and health care
providers with an array of difficult choices. The parents, full of anticipa-
tion and excitement, "may be reeling emotionally from the shock of hav-
ing a seriously ill child instead of the normal, healthy infant they had
imagined."' Recent technological advances make it possible to sustain
hopelessly ill patients for prolonged periods of time,2 but the effectiveness
of such treatment may require the parents to make quick decisions based
on uncertain predictions about the infant's prognosis. 3 The decision
whether to treat can raise troubling moral and ethical dilemmas, espe-
cially in cases involving severe malformations or disabilities that would
prevent a "normal" life if the infant were to survive.4
Hard decisions concerning the infant's treatment traditionally have
been made after consultation between the infant's physician and parents. 5
Recently, some health care providers have begun to rely on internal eth-
ics committees 6 or other professionals, including religious counselors and
* Associate Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, New Orleans, Louisiana. B.A.,
1969, Swarthmore College; J.D., 1974, University of Pennsylvania. The author wishes to
thank Mary Brent and Victoria Johnson for their excellent research assistance, and fellow law
professors Dan Rosen and Steve Smith for their help with this Article.
1. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING
TREATMENT 216 (1983) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION].
2. Id. at 197-98; see also Singer & Kuhse, The Future of Baby Jane Doe, N.Y. REV.
BOOKS, Mar. 1, 1984, at 18-19 (citing Surgeon General C. Everett Koop's statement that an
infant born without an intestine can be sustained for up to 18 months).
3. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 198-99.
4. R. WEIR, SELECTIVE NONTREATMENT OF HANDICAPPED NEWBORNS 177-84
(1984) (discussing various positions taken by ethicists).
5. See, eg., Duff & Campbell, Moral and Ethical Dilemmas in the Special-Care Nursery,
289 NEW ENG. J. MED. 890, 892-94 (1973) (urging doctors to consult with parents in decision-
making process).
6. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 161-62; see also In re Quinlan, 70 N.J.
10, 49-51, 355 A.2d 647, 668-69, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) (endorsing use of hospital
ethics committees). For a discussion of ethics committees elsewhere in this symposium, see
Shapiro & Barthel, Infant Care Review Committees: An Effective Approach to the Baby Doe
[863]
social workers, to assist the primary decision-makers. 7
The addition of ethics committees or other consultants to the deci-
sion-making procedure has helped to ensure that the ultimate treatment
decision is an informed one.8 But at least since the widely criticized 1982
Indiana Infant Doe case,9 this type of procedure has been under attack.
Right-to-life groups have labeled such cases infanticide.' 0 Partially in
response to those groups, the Reagan administration attempted unsuc-
cessfully to use section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973" I to support
Dilemma?, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 827 (1986); Smith, Disabled Newborns and the Federal Child
Abuse Amendments: Tenuous Protection, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 765 (1986).
7. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 452 (listing composition of various ethics
committees); see also Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 95 A.D.2d 587, 588, 467 N.Y.S.2d 685,
686, aff'd per curiam, 60 N.Y.2d 208, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63, cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1026 (1983) (Baby Jane Doe's parents consulted with various professionals before refus-
ing to consent to surgery).
8. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 162-65 (discussing appropriate func-
tion of hospital ethics committees).
9. In re Infant Doe, No. GU 8204-004A (Monroe County Cir. Ct., Ind. Apr. 12, 1982),
cert. denied sub nom., Infant Doe v. Bloomington Hosp., 464 U.S. 961 (1983). In this case,
"parents elected to forgo treatment of their newborn child who had Down's syndrome,
tracheoesophageal atresia, and possibly additional anomalies." PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION,
supra note 1, at 224 n.92. The facts of the Infant Doe case are unclear because the record was
sealed. Id. It does appear that there was an extensive review of the facts of the case by a
guardian ad litem appointed to represent the infant and by a six-person task force assigned to
review the decision. These parties apparently concurred in the decision not to seek court-
ordered treatment. See Smith, Life and Death Decisions in the Nursery: Standards and Proce-
dures for Withholding Lifesaving Treatment from Infants, 27 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1125, 1136
n.41 (1982). The Infant Doe case inspired efforts on the part of the federal government to
intercede in such cases. See Vitiello, The Baby Jane Doe Litigation and Section 504: An Exer-
cise in Raw Executive Power, 17 CONN. L. REV. 95, 98-102 (1984) (discussing Reagan adminis-
tration's response to the Infant Doe case). For a criticism of that decision, see, for example, J.
ROBERTSON, THE RIGHTS OF THE CRITICALLY ILL: THE BASIC A.C.L.U. GUIDE TO THE
RIGHTS OF CRITICALLY ILL AND DYING PATIENTS 88 (1983); Reagan, Abortion and the Con-
science of the Nation, 9 HUM. LIFE REV. 7, 9-10 (1983).
10. See, e.g., AMERICANS UNITED FOR LIFE LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, SUMMARY ANAL-
YSIS OF FINAL "BABY DOE" RULES WITH RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 10 (1984); see
also Brooks, Ethical Dilemmas in the Treatment of Critically Ill Newborns, I J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 133 (1985) (decisions allowing infant death rest on faulty data and faulty
reasoning).
11. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (1973) (codi-
fied as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (West 1982)). In the government's petition for a writ of
certiorari in Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 106 S. Ct. 2101 (1986), the government offered
the following explanation of how the regulations proposed by HHS on July 5, 1983 (Nondis-
crimination on the Basis of Handicap, 48 Fed. Reg. 9630 (1983) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 84))
would apply section 504 to cases involving seriously ill newborns:
The regulations explain the basic applicability of Section 504 in this setting through
interpretive guidelines, which establish four basic principles: (1) health care providers
receiving federal financial assistance "may not, solely on the basis of present or antic-
ipated physical or mental impairments of an infant, withhold treatment or nourish-
ment from the infant who, in spite of such impairments, will medically benefit from
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federal intervention in such cases. 12 More recently, Congress amended
the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment and Adoption Reform Act of
1978 ("Act") to encompass cases involving denial of medically appropri-
ate treatment to seriously ill newborns. 13 The amendments make the
failure to provide life-sustaining treatment to a disabled infant a form of
child neglect. 14 Unlike the government's attempted use of section 504,
the amendments leave the enforcement of such cases to state child pro-
tective agencies.' 5
These legislative and regulatory measures provide mechanisms
through which the state can oversee the propriety of nontreatment deci-
sions. Although the degree of popular support for these efforts is not
clear, at least they have placed the issue in the public forum where
healthy debate may produce a consensus on how such decisions should
be made and the extent to which society is willing to subsidize the cost of
raising a severely disabled person.' 6 Far more controversial are actions
the treatment or nourishment"; (2) treatment that is futile or will do no more than
temporarily prolong the act of dying of a terminally ill infant is not considered treat-
ment that will medically benefit the infant for purposes of Section 504; (3) reasonable
medical judgments in selecting among alternative courses of treatment will be
respected; and (4) where a parent withholds consent to treatment that is medically
indicated, the hospital may not, solely on the basis of the infant's handicap, decline to
report the matter to the appropriate child protective agency or to see judicial review.
12. See Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 106 S. Ct. 2101 (1986); United States v. Univer-
sity Hosp., 575 F. Supp. 607 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 729 F.2d 144, 146 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding
that section 504 does not authorize the government to compel hospital to release infant's medi-
cal records to determine whether discrimination on the basis of handicap was taking place).
For a critical appraisal of the government's position in the University Hospital case, see Vi-
tiello, supra note 9, at 98-121.
13. Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-457, 98 Stat. 1749 (1984) (codified
at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5102-5106, 5111-5113, 5115 (West Supp. 1985)). The implementing regula-
tions are contained in the Child Abuse and Neglect Prevention and Treatment Program, 45
C.F.R. § 1340 (1985). For a critical appraisal of that act and the regulations promulgated
thereunder, see Smith, supra note 6.
14. Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-457, 98 Stat. 1749, 1752 (codified
at 42 U.S.C.A. § 5102 (West Supp. 1985).
15. Id.
16. See J. LYON, PLAYING GOD IN THE NURSERY 286-93 (1985) (discussing debate sur-
rounding expenditure for seriously ill newborns). It is ironic that cases like Baby Jane Doe's
have been seen as right-to-life cases. Properly construed, the infant's self-appointed advocate
is claiming a right to impose a lifetime of expensive treatment. See id. at 285. It is important
to recognize the hidden claim on behalf of the infant. In many cases, the parents will be unable
to afford adequate treatment. The issue to be clarified is whether proponents of a right to
treatment are contending that the infant has a right to treatment paid by government. The
United States Supreme Court has rejected such a right when made on constitutional grounds.
See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326 (1980) (upholding withdrawal of funding for abortions
from federal medical benefits programs); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977) (holding no
constitutional right requires state or federal government to subsidize non-therapeutic
abortions).
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by more confrontational right-to-life advocates who find such legisla-
tively mandated procedures inadequate and instead try to compel treat-
ment for some dying patients. The Baby Jane Doe case, Weber v. Stony
Brook Hospital,17 is illustrative. Baby Jane Doe was born with a series of
physical anomalies, 18 including spina bifida 19 and hydrocephalus.20 Af-
ter extensive consultation, the infant's parents rejected surgery that
might have prolonged the infant's life, but that could not improve her
prospects for a sapient existence. 2' An anonymous tip alerted the De-
partment of Health and Human Services ("HHS") to Baby Jane Doe's
plight. 22 HHS filed a complaint with the Child Protection Services
("CPS"), the New York State agency responsible for investigating cases
of child neglect and abuse. The agency found the complaint groundless. 23
Dissatisfied with the finding, a member of the hospital staff contacted A.
Lawrence Washburn, Jr., a right-to-life attorney.24 Washburn, though in
no way related to the infant, made repeated unsuccessful efforts to secure
a judicial order compelling treatment.25
Washburn's conduct provoked sharp criticism. Even the New York
Court of Appeals upholding the parents' decision in the Baby Jane Doe
case characterized Washburn's 26 conduct as "unusual, and sometimes of-
fensive."'27 Numerous editorials representing a wide array of political
opinion expressed consternation at the plight of Baby Jane Doe's fam-
17. 60 N.Y.2d 208, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63, aff'g per curiam 95 A.D.2d 587,
467 N.Y.S.2d 685, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1026 (1983).
18. Id. Transcript of Oct. 19-20, 1983 Hearing Before Justice Melvyn Tanenbaum,
Supreme Court of New York, Suffolk County 22-28, 45.
19. Myelomeningocele (spina bifida) involves a saccular enlargement that includes the
spinal cord or nerves in the sac formation and protrudes through the vertebral column. See
Robertson, Involuntary Euthanasia of Defective Newborns: A Legal Analysis, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 213, 214 n.7 (1975) (citing J. WARKANY, CONGENITAL MALFORMATIONS 272 (1971)).
20. "Hydrocephaly is characterized by an increase of free fluid in the cranial cavity which
results in a marked enlargement of the head." Robertson, supra note 19, at 213 n.4 (citing J.
WARKANY, supra note 19, at 217).
21. United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144, 146 (2d Cir. 1984).
22. Id. at 147.
23. Id. at 146.
24. J. LYON, supra note 16, at 46. The informant has never been identified, but presuma-
bly the identity of the informant could be ascertained through proper discovery in an action
against Washburn. Cf Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690-91 (1972) (rejecting news re-
porter's privilege to withhold from grand jury identity of confidential source suspected of crim-
inal activity).
25. The New York Court of Appeals relied on this fact in its decision. See Weber v.
Stony Brook Hosp., 60 N.Y.2d 208, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63, cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1026 (1983). See infra notes 60-80 & accompanying text.
26. The court did not refer specifically to Washburn by name, but accounts of the case
make clear that the court had Washburn in mind. See, e.g., J. LYON, supra note 16, at 50.
27. Weber, 60 N.Y.2d at 209, 456 N.E.2d at 1187, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 64.
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ily.28 Much of the criticism was directed toward the Reagan administra-
tion's efforts to intervene. 29 Commentators also argued, however, that
Washburn's actions as a self-appointed intervenor-or, what might be
called an officious intermeddler- interfered with the parents' role as the
appropriate decision-makers. 30 That indictment is persuasive,31 but it
too easily assumes that such intervention violates recognized privacy
rights apparently premised on broad parental autonomy rights over fam-
ily matters. 32
The scope of parental autonomy should not be overstated. Although
once deemed almost absolute,33 the state may rightfully override parental
autonomy in child-rearing in bona fide instances of neglect and abuse.3 4
The state has a strong interest in the full reporting of cases of abuse and
neglect to appropriate agencies. Neglect laws enable the state to fulfill its
role as parens patriae, that is, its interest in protecting those unable to
protect themselves. As a result, many abuse statutes provide informants
anonymity or immunity in order to protect them from fear of reprisals. 35
Those statutes reflect a balance of competing interests. They allow state
investigation of suspected child abuse, but respect parental autonomy
because trained agency personnel conduct the investigation and must fol-
low statutorily prescribed procedures, allowing the state to investigate
abuse without bringing formal, public proceedings.
Not satisfied with these procedures, some right-to-life advocates
have gone further and intruded upon the decision-making process in
cases in which they disagree with the course of treatment chosen by
28. See, eg., Cohen, Baby Jane, Washington Post, Nov. 29, 1983, at B1, col. 1; Kilpa-
trick, Crucial Question Forgotten, New Orleans Times Picayune, Nov. 15, 1983, at A9, col. 1;
Goodman, A Visit from an Intrusive Uncle, Washington Post, Nov. 12, 1983, at A19, col. 1;
Cruelty and Baby Jane, New York Times, Nov. 1, 1983, at A26, col. 1; Big Brother Doe, Wall
Street Journal, Oct. 31, 1983, at 24, col. 1.
29. See, e.g., Big Brother Doe, supra note 28.
30. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 28.
31. This author shares the same concern. See Vitiello, supra note 9.
32. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 28; Big Brother Doe, supra note 28.
33. See Bopp & Balch, The Child Abuse Amendments of 1984 and their Implementing
Regulations: A Summary, I IssuEs L. & MED. 91, 92 (1985) (discussing nirieteenth-century
view that privacy of the family was sacred); see also Smith, supra note 6 at 771-73.
34. See Smith, supra note 6, at 776-80 (state has interest sufficiently compelling to over-
ride parental autonomy rights); see also infra notes 226-30 & accompanying text.
35. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-38(a) to -38(c) (West Supp. 1985) (immu-
nity); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-11-7 (Burns Supp. 1985) (immunity); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-
1-409 (Supp. 1985) (anonymity); see also NATIONAL CENTER ON CHILD ABUSE AND NE-
GLECT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CHILD PROTECTION: A GUIDE FOR
STATE LEGISLATION § 3 (1983), reprinted in PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 478
(anonymity).
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health care professionals and the patient's family. 36 Such intervention
upsets the balance between autonomy rights and limited state interven-
tion. Instead of a discreet professional agency proceeding, Washburn,
for example, attempted to force discovery of Baby Jane Doe's medical
records for examination by a medical expert closely identified with the
right-to-life cause. 37 Unlike confidential agency proceedings, 38 litigation
had the foreseeable, and apparently intended, 39 consequence of exposing
all of the details of the Baby Jane Doe case to public scrutiny, even
though the parents' decision turned out to be defensible. That conduct
impaired two separate interests of the infant's parents-their ability to
make decisions on behalf of the infant, an autonomy right, and their in-
terest in being free from unwanted public attention, a privacy right.
Baby Jane Doe is not likely to be an isolated instance. Right-to-life
groups increasingly have begun to focus on medical treatment deci-
sions. 40 Moreover, as persuasively argued by Professor Smith elsewhere
in this symposium, recent amendments to the federal child abuse and
neglect law have fallen short of the hopes of many advocates of aggres-
sive treatment for seriously ill newborns. 41 Predictably, there will be
more instances of intermeddling by zealous members of the right-to-life
movement because they will be frustrated by the failure to force treat-
ment in cases like Baby Jane Doe's. Elsewhere, some members of the
36. See, e.g., Spring v. Geriatric Auth., 475 N.E.2d 727 (Mass. 1985) (right-to-life mem-
bers made unauthorized visits to senile patient to determine whether he wanted kidney dialysis
continued); see also J. LYON, supra note 16, at 41-45 (citing cases of abuse of the "Baby Doe
hot-line").
37. See 60 Minutes: Baby Jane Doe's Parents, Transcript of televised interview of A.
Lawrence Washburn, at 3 (CBS broadcast, Mar. 11, 1984; used herein by permission of CBS.
CBS reserves all rights.) ("Our expert is Dr. McGlone [sic] of Children's Hospital in Chicago
and by the reason of the size of Baby Jane Doe's head ... he predicts normal intelligence.")
[hereinafter cited as 60 Minutes]. Dr. David McLone of Chicago's Children's Memorial Hos-
pital "is the leader of a crusade to treat all babies born with myelomeningocele." J. LYON,
supra note 16, at 186.
38. Many statutes provide specifically that the proceedings shall be confidential. See, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.51 (West Supp. 1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.36.3 (West
Supp. 1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4008 (Supp. 1985); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 722.627 (West. Supp. 1985); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT art. 10, § 1043 (McKinney Supp. 1981).
Interestingly, some states provide for criminal and civil sanctions against a party who reveals
confidential information. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4008(4) (West Supp. 1985)
(criminal sanctions); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.633 (West Supp. 1985) (civil and crimi-
nal sanctions). This Article argues that a civil remedy should be available against anyone who
reveals confidential information, even absent legislative action. These statutes, however,
demonstrate that public policy favors privacy rights.
39. See 60 Minutes, supra note 37, at 2 ("I entered this [case] because I ... do not wish to
consent or to remain silent while an innocent human life is taken in America.").
40. See infra notes 86-105 & accompanying text.
41. Smith, supra note 6, at 818-19.
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fight-to-life movement have resorted to self-help or civil disobedience to
prevent abortions when they have been frustrated by the refusal of courts
and legislatures to heed their cause. 42
Such conduct seriously threatens privacy rights. Although parents
in cases like Baby Jane Doe's do not have an absolute right to unfettered
decision-making, they ought to be protected from interference beyond
those measures the state finds reasonably necessary to protect the infant's
interests. This Article examines whether the law provides a remedy for
the victims of efforts by strangers to compel treatment for seriously ill
newborns 43 and discusses the extent to which an action for invasion of
privacy may provide that relief.
The Article first reviews the Baby Jane Doe case to illustrate the
facts that may give rise to an action for an invasion of privacy against
officious intermeddlers. 44 The Article then argues that an infant's pri-
vacy action would fail, primarily because of the infant's lack of awareness
of the defendants' conduct, but also because of policy considerations that
have prevented courts from finding a right of action in "wrongful life"
cases.4 5 Finally, the Article argues that the concept of privacy is suffi-
ciently flexible to encompass a distinct action by the parents despite the
absence of precise precedent for it.46 Such an action is particularly ap-
propriate in light of parents' constitutionally protected autonomy rights
in matters affecting the family.47
The Baby Jane Doe Litigation
Baby Jane Doe was born on October 11, 1983, at St. Charles Hospi-
tal in Port Jefferson, New York.48 She suffered from "multiple serious
disorders, including myelomeningocele (commonly known as spina
bifida), a failure of the normal closure of the bones and the coverings of
the spinal cord, microcephaly, a small head circumference, bespeaking
increased pressure in the cranial cavity, and hydrocephalus, a condition
42. C. PAIGE, THE RIGHT TO LIFERS 75-79, 218-20 (1983) (describing efforts of right-to-
life advocates to disrupt abortion clinics, including bombings of abortion clinics and kidnap-
ping of clinic owners).
43. This Article deals specifically with cases in which strangers attempt to compel treat-
ment for seriously ill minors. But a similar analysis would apply when outsiders try to intrude
upon the right of family members to make a decision on behalf of the incompetent patient. See
infra notes 86-88 & accompanying text. A parallel privacy analysis might also apply in cases
in which right-to-life members attempt to persuade a woman not to have an abortion.
44. See infra notes 48-84 & accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 132-91 & accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 235-346 & accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 203-33 & accompanying text.
48. J. LYON, supra note 16, at 45-46.
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in which fluid fails to drain from the cranial areas."'49 The infant also
suffered from "bilateral upper extremity spasticity, a prolapsed rectum, a
malformed brain stem, and additional problems indicating severe malfor-
mation of her nervous system." 50
The infant's parents consented to her transfer to Stony Brook Uni-
versity Hospital for possible corrective surgery.5' There, after consulta-
tion with health care professionals and counselors,5 2 the parents refused
to consent to surgery to close the infant's spine, an operation that could
increase her life span, but that could not remedy the underlying
anomalies.5 3
There has been heated debate over the extent of Baby Jane Doe's
paralysis, retardation, and probable future pain and suffering.54 At least
one attending physician believed that surgery might significantly prolong
Baby Jane Doe's life, but that her prospects for a normal life were
bleak. 55 In his view, even with surgery she would be bedridden, would
have to be fed by hand or by an artificial feeding device, would be subject
to bladder infections caused by incontinence that eventually would lead
to kidney failure, and would lack the ability to interact meaningfully
with her environment. Although not as pessimistic in his prognosis, the
hospital's chief neurologist believed that the infant's microcephaly indi-
cated brain malfunction. 56
After the infant's parents refused to consent to surgery, a member of
the hospital staff nonetheless contacted A. Lawrence Washburn, Jr.,
about Lhe case.57 Published reports do not reveal how Washburn came to
the attention of the disgruntled staff member or what position the staff
49. See Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 95 A.D.2d 587, 588, 467 N.Y.S.2d 685, 686, aff'd
per curiam, 60 N.Y.2d 208, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 1188, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63, 65, cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1026 (1983).
50. Brief for the State of New York at 3-4, United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d
144 (2d Cir. 1984).
51. Weber, 95 A.D.2d at 588, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 686.
52. Id.
53. Record at 48, 138.
54. See Hentoff, Troublemaking Babies and Pious Liberals, reprinted in 10 HuM. LIFE
REV. 91, 93-94 (1984). Hentoff asserts that one neurologist's "view of Baby Jane Doe's future
was decidedly bleak. On the other hand .... [the] chief of neurological surgery at the same
hospital, who had treated some 350 spina bifida children, was in favor of surgery." Id at 93.
Hentoff misleads his reader. The chief neurosurgeon also testified that the infant's future
would be poor. Record at 141-42, 174-76. A very different view of the infant's condition was
reported elsewhere. See, e.g., articles cited supra note 28.
55. Record at 32, 45-47.
56. Id. at 141-42, 174-76.
57. J. LYON, supra note 16, at 46.
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member held at the hospital.58 Washburn, however, has a reputation for
his zeal in bringing lawsuits on behalf of fetuses and disabled infants.59
Washburn filed an action in the New York Supreme Court to compel
surgery, 60 and the court appointed William E. Weber, a local attorney, as
guardian ad litem to replace Washburn. 61
Shortly after Washburn commenced state court proceedings, an un-
identified person contacted the Department of Health and Human Serv-
ices ("HHS") about the infant. HHS fied a complaint with the Child
Protective Services ("CPS"), a state agency with jurisdiction over child
abuse cases. After an investigation, CPS found no neglect.62 The state
court, however, held an evidentiary hearing, and ordered that the infant
undergo surgery. 63 On the same day, in Weber v. Stony Brook Hospital,64
a judge of the appellate division of the supreme court reversed that order
and dismissed the proceeding. 65
. The appellate division observed that the proceeding was properly
entertained by the trial court on the ground that apart from any statutory
authority, "a court of equity has both the power and responsibility to
care for and protect all those persons who, by virtue of some legal disa-
bility, are unable to protect themselves. '66 On the merits, however, the
appellate division rejected the trial court's findings that Baby Jane Doe
had been denied adequate medical care or that her parents' refusal to
consent to surgery placed her in imminent danger.67 The court noted
that the only medical experts who testified agreed that the parents'
choice of medical treatment in lieu of surgery was "well within accepted
medical standards and that there was no medical reason to disturb the
parents' decision."68
58. See, e.g., id. at 46-55; see also United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144 (2d
Cir. 1984).
59. J. LYON, supra note 16, at 46.
60. See United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144, 146 (2d Cir. 1984) (describing
procedural history of case).
61. Record at 5.
62. United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144, 147 (2d Cir. 1984). HHS subse-
quently requested Baby Jane Doe's medical records from the hospital, pursuant to its regula-
tions under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. After the hospital refused, HHS
brought suit to compel the hospital to produce the documents. The district court entered
summary judgment in favor of the hospital and the second circuit affirmed. Id.
63. Id. at 238.
64. 95 A.D.2d 587, 467 N.Y.S.2d 685, aff'd per curiam, 60 N.Y.2d 208, 456 N.E.2d
1186, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63, cert denied, 464 U.S. 1026 (1983).
65. Id. at 589, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 687.
66. Id. at 588, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 686 (citation omitted).
67. Id. at 589, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 687.
68. Id.
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The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal ordered by the appellate
division. 69 The court held that the trial court abused its discretion by
permitting the procedure to go forward and stated that it should have
granted a "broadly grounded motion" to dismiss the proceedings. 70 Os-
tensibly, the court's decision was based upon procedural grounds, rely-
ing on the express legislative design of family court procedures to help
protect children from injury or mistreatment. 7' The Family Court Act
specified that such child neglect proceedings may be brought only by a
child protective agency or by "a person on the court's direction. '72 The
Baby Jane Doe action, in contrast, was brought "at the behest of a person
who had no disclosed relationship with the child, her parents, her family,
or those treating her illnesses."' 73 The court saw no reason to deviate
from the statutory procedures. 74
In addition, the per curiam opinion implied that Washburn had vio-
lated rights of the parents. For example, it found "unusual, and some-
times offensive, activities and proceedings of those who have sought...
to displace parental responsibility for and management of [the infant's]
medical care."' 75 The court expressed concern that Washburn had "cata-
pult[ed] [himself] into the very heart of a family circle, there to challenge
the most private and most precious responsibility vested in the parents for
the care and nurture of their children."' 76 The court also cited the legisla-
ture's efforts to balance the parents' rights as primary decision-makers on
behalf of their child with those of an abused infant, as reflected in the
Family Court Act. In effect, by limiting the parties who may initiate
abuse proceedings, the legislature gave recognition to the family's right
to be free from unwarranted intervention. 77
The court of appeals did not articulate a specific theory upon which
the parents might sue an intermeddler. But Weber certainly implies that
legally protected interests had been violated without justification:
Confronted with the anguish of the birth of a child with severe physi-
cal disorders, these parents, in consequence of judicial procedure for
which there is no precedent or authority, have been subjected in this
last two weeks to litigation through all three levels of our State's court
69. Weber, 60 N.Y.2d at 213, 456 N.E.2d at 1188, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 65.
70. Id. at 209, 456 N.E.2d at 1187, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 64.
71. Id. (citing Family Court Act § 1011, N.Y. JUD. LAW § 1011 (McKinney 1983)).
72. Weber, 60 N.Y.2d at 209, 456 N.E.2d at 1187, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 64 (citing Family
Court Act § 1032, N.Y. JUD. LAW § 1034 (McKinney 1983)).
73. Weber, 60 N.Y.2d at 210, 456 N.E.2d at 1188, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 65.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 209, 456 N.E.2d at 1187, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 64.
76. Id. at 210, 456 N.E.2d at 1188, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 65 (emphasis added).
77. Id. at 209, 456 N.E.2d at 1187-88, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 64-65.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37
system. We find no justification for resort to or entertainment of these
proceedings. 78
After being rebuffed by state courts, Washburn filed a class action in
the federal district court in Albany, New York.79 The court dismissed
the action and fined Washburn $500 for bringing a frivolous suit.s°
Despite considerable expense and emotional harm to the infant's
parents,"' the parents ultimately were vindicated by the courts. They
voluntarily agreed to surgical implantation of a shunt to relieve pressure
from the infant's hydrocephalic condition.82 The opening in the infant's
spine closed without surgery, reducing some of the risk of imminent
death from infection.8 3 Baby Jane Doe's parents finally were able to
bring her home.84 After unwanted national attention, the family has
vanished from the public eye.
The Baby Jane Doe litigation might not warrant extensive comment
had it been an isolated incident. Examples of officious intermeddling or
self-help-instances in which individuals act outside of established legal
channels to press their right-to-life views-are becoming more common.
Washburn himself apparently had a history of bringing similar actions
on behalf of fetuses and seriously ill minors.85 Elsewhere, members of a
New England right-to-life group who were dissatisfied with a court order
permitting. a senile patient, Earle Spring, to be withdrawn from kidney
dialysis treatments sought to intercede in the matter.8 6 Several members
of the medical staff of the nursing center where Spring resided published
a letter expressing their opposition to the order in a local newspaper.8 7
Some staff members also cooperated with a nurse and physician who had
no involvement with the center or the patient, but who interviewed
Spring and then prepared affidavits that were used to support a motion to
intervene in the ongoing termination-of-treatment proceedings.88
78. Id. at 210, 456 N.E.2d at 1188, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 65.
79. See Saving Baby Jane from Her Saviors, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1984, at 24A, col. 1.
80. See Suit by Lawyer over Baby Jane Doe is Thrown Out, N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1984,
§ 1, at 24, col. 6.
81. See 60 Minutes, supra note 37, at 4, 6.
82. See Baby Jane Doe Has Surgery to Remove Water from the Brain, N.Y. Times, Apr.
7, 1984, § 1, at 28, col. 3.
83. J. LYON, supra note 16, at 55.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 46.
86. See Spring v. Geriatric Auth., 475 N.E.2d 727 (Mass. 1985); see also In re Spring, 380
Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980) (court order allowing withdrawal of senile patient from life-
sustaining kidney dialysis).
87. See Spring v. Geriatric Auth., 475 N.E.2d 727, 729 (Mass. 1985) (action by senile
patient's widow for, inter alia, invasion of patient's right of privacy).
88. Id.
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Many right-to-life groups feel outraged by cases like those of Baby
Jane Doe and Earle Spring, which they perceive as a facet of the right-to-
die movement. 89 For example, the President of the Human Life Alliance
of Minnesota has characterized proponents of the living will as "death
peddlers [who] have created a climate of confusion, anxiety and dis-
gust."90 Another group was dismayed by the rules promulgated by
HHS in response to the Infant Doe case, interpreting them as a retreat
from aggressive advocacy. 91 This group, the Americans United for Life
Legal Defense Fund, found that "the prominent role assigned by the final
rule, at the option of each hospital, to Infant Care Review Committees is
a major defeat."'92 It argued that physicians "harbor outdated views
about the potential of people with disabilities" and, therefore, that the
fact that hospital review committees play a primary role in assuring
equal treatment for defective newborns "sets the fox to watch the chicken
coop."'93 Anonymous tips about suspected abuse have become more fre-
quent, encouraged by the Infant Doe hot-line.94
In 1984, Congress again attempted to deal with withdrawal of treat-
ment from impaired newborns through amendments to the Child Abuse
Prevention and Treatment Act.95 In order to qualify for assistance under
the Act, a state must have procedures "in place for the purpose of re-
sponding to the reporting of medical neglect (including instances of with-
holding of medically indicated treatment from disabled infants with life-
89. See, e.g., Barry, The Ethics of Providing Life-Sustaining Nutrition and Fluids to In-
competent Patients, J. FAM. & CULTURE, Summer 1985, at 23; Meilaender, On Removing Food
and Water: Against the Stream, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Dec. 1984, at 11; Siegler & Weis-
bard, Against the Emerging Stream: Should Fluids and Nutritional Support Be Discontinued?,
145 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 129 (1985); see also Letter from National Doctors for Life
submitted to Nat'l Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (opposing uniform
"living wills" statute), July 19, 1985.
90. Senander, The Right-to-Die Movement Ignores Essential Right to Live, Minneapolis
Star & Tribune, Apr. 21, 1985, at A25, Col. 1.
91. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap, 49 Fed. Reg. 1622 (1984) (codified at
45 C.F.R. § 84.55 (1985)). For discussion of these regulations, see Smith, supra note 6, at 800-
04; Smith, Quality of Life, Sanctity of Creation: Palliative or Apotheosis?, 63 NEB. L. REV. 709,
717-20 (1984).
92. AMERICANS UNITED FOR LIFE LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, supra note 10, at 15.
93. Id.
94. J. LYON, supra note 16, at 41-45. In the regulations to section 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (1973) (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982)), HHS established a 24-hour toll-free telephone line to report suspected
cases of noncompliance with the regulations. A call would activate an HHS investigation. See
also 49 Fed. Reg. 1622 (1984) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 84.55 (1985)).
95. Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-457, 98 Stat. 1749 (1984) (codified
at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5101-5106, 5111-5113, 5115 (West Supp. 1985)).
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threatening conditions). '96 The amendments were the result of political
compromise.97 But, as argued by Professor Smith elsewhere in this sym-
posium, the amendments do not compel a change in state substantive law
under which those cases arose.98
James Bopp, Jr., who, as general counsel to the National Right to
Life Committee,99 had an active role in promulgating the 1984 amend-
ments, has acknowledged some of the shortcomings of the Act.1°° His
response to concern about weak enforcement by state agencies is to ex-
hort more private actions like those brought by Washburn:
It is absolutely essential that individual attorneys who represent the
interests of people with disabilities, be thoroughly familiar with the
enforcement mechanisms established by the Act and regulations and
prepared both to monitor their employment with the sensitivity of
watchdogs while bringing independent legal actions whenever
possible. 10 1
As Bopp indicates, such private actions are not authorized by the Act. 0 2
Thus, if his exhortation is followed, there will be more Baby Jane Doe
cases.
Furthermore, because the amendments do not change state law,
there will undoubtedly be more instances in which life-sustaining treat-
ment will be denied seriously ill newborns. That would seem to follow
from the fact that many seriously ill newborns are allowed to die under
the current laws of many states-hence the pressure to federalize such
cases in the first place. 103 How such cases come to the attention of right-
to-life groups is not always documented. 10 4 But at least in some in-
stances of withdrawal of treatment, medical personnel with right-to-life
sympathies or affiliation have contacted those groups. 0 5 Undoubtedly,
those informants believed that their duty of confidentiality is outweighed
in cases of denial of treatment, which they view as a form of murder. 10 6
96. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5103(b)(2)(K) (West Supp. 1985).
97. Bopp & Balch, supra note 33; Smith, supra note 6, at 797.
98. Smith, supra note 6, at 814.
99. Bopp & Balch, supra note 33, at 91 n.*.
100. Id. at 119-22, 130.
101. Id. at 120.
102. Id. at 130.
103. See Smith, supra note 6.
104. See, eg., J. LYON, supra note 16, at 46 (unidentified member of hospital staff con-
tacted Washburn).
105. See, e.g., Spring v. Geriatric Auth., 475 N.E.2d 727, 729 (Mass. 1985) (disgruntled
staff members wrote to local newspaper, protesting court order withdrawing treatment from
senile patient).
106. See, e.g., AMERICANS UNITED FOR LIFE LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, supra note 10, at
10 ("The most blatant-and universally condemned infanticide episode occurred in Blooming-
ton, Indiana in April 1982."); 60 Minutes, supra note 37, at 2 (Washburn states that he refuses
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Recent history is replete with instances in which zealous members of
right-to-life groups have violated the law in the name of morality. 10 7
Such conduct has ranged from indisputably criminal acts, like kidnap-
ping and bombing, to conduct like Washburn's in the Baby Jane Doe
case and other milder forms of protest. 10 8 This conduct probably re-
sulted in part from frustration within the right-to-life movement stem-
ming from the movement's failure to elicit what it would consider
effective anti-abortion legislation from Congress. 10 9 If this causal con-
nection between frustration in the legal arena and stepped-up self-help
measures is true, 110 it is likely that there will be more cases like Baby
Jane Doe's in the future. Faced with that prospect, it is important to
determine whether the law recognizes an action for invasion of privacy to
provide a remedy against such intermeddling.
Privacy Actions on Behalf of the Impaired Infant
A Brief History
Virtually all discussions of invasion of privacy begin with at least a
passing reference to the 1890 Harvard Law Review article by Samuel D.
Warren and Louis D. Brandeis."II Warren and Brandeis "reviewed a
number of cases in which relief had been afforded on the basis of defama-
tion, invasion of some property right, or breach of confidence or an im-
plied contract, and concluded that they were in reality based upon a
broader principle which was entitled to separate recognition." " 2
The significance of the article by Warren and Brandeis has been de-
bated extensively.1 3 As observed by one commentator, "the article's ef-
to remain silent as long as innocent human life is being taken in America.); Senander, supra
note 90, at col. 1 (characterizing right-to-life advocates as "death peddlers").
107. See C. PAIGE, supra note 42, at 75-76 (documenting disruptive conduct and unsuc-
cessful trial defense of right-to-life members assertedly grounded in obedience to higher moral
law); id. at 218- 20 (recounting criminal conduct against abortion clinic operators and abortion
clinics).
108. Id. at 75 (harassment of women attempting to procure an abortion); see supra note
42.
109. Id. at 221-40 (analyzing failures of right-to-life groups to get legislation passed by
Congress).
110. Id.
111. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890); see, e.g.,
Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis' Privacy Tort, 68
CORNELL L. REV. 291, 292 (1983).
112. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 849
(5th ed. 1984) (footnotes omitted).
113. See, e.g., Barron, Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193
(1890): Demystifying a Landmark Citation, 13 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 875 (1979); Bloustein,
Privacy, Tort Law, and the Constitution: Is Warren and Brandeis' Tort Petty and Unconstitu-
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fect could be said to exemplify the power, the impotence, or even the
perniciousness of legal scholarship."' 14 During the past ninety-five years
a right of action based on privacy has been all but universally recog-
nized. 115 But as another commentator has pointed out, the concept of
privacy has not developed primarily along the lines envisioned by War-
ren and Brandeis, who "intended primarily to lay down legal principles
to protect an individual's right of privacy against contemporary practi-
tioners of late nineteenth-century yellow journalism." 116 Development of
that aspect of privacy has been retarded because of conflict with the first
amendment's protection of a free press. 17
Dean Prosser probably has had a more enduring effect on the pri-
vacy tort than did Warren and Brandeis." 8 In a 1960 law review article,
Prosser reviewed "something over three hundred [privacy] cases in the
books" to identify systematically "what interests [we are] protecting, and
against what conduct."' 19 He concluded that the case law revealed "four
distinct kinds of invasion of four different interests of the plaintiff, which
are tied together by the common name, but otherwise have almost noth-
ing in common except that each represents an interference with the right
of the plaintiff. . . 'to be let alone.' ",120
Prosser's treatment of privacy has had a significant impact on the
development of the right of action. Since 1960, most privacy decisions
have discussed and usually adopted his approach. 121 Prosser's view has
been adopted by the second Restatement of Torts.122 Section 652A of the
tional as Well?, 46 TEX. L. REv. 611 (1968); Gavison, Privacy and the Limits ofLaw, 89 YALE
L.J. 421 (1980); Zimmerman, supra note 111.
114. Zimmerman, supra note 111, at 292.
115. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 112, at 855; Zimmerman, supra note 111,
at 365-67 (appendix listing status of the right of action in all jurisdictions). Not all jurisdic-
tions adopt the privacy right of action in RESTATEMENT form.
116. Barron, supra note 113, at 877.
117. Id. at 880; see Zimmerman, supra note 11, at 306-20.
118. Dean Prosser called the Warren and Brandeis article "the outstanding example of the
influence of legal periodicals upon the American law." Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REv.
383, 383 (1960). Other writers have identified Prosser's article as a watershed in the develop-
ment of the privacy tort. See, e.g., Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law--Were Warren and Brandeis
Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 331-33 (1966).
119. Prosser, supra note 118, at 388.
120. Id. at 389 (quoting T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTs 29 (2d ed.
1888)).
121. See, e.g., Howard v. Des Moines Register & Tribune Co., 283 N.W.2d 289 (Iowa
1979) (en banc); Klipa v. Board of Educ., 54 Md. App. 644, 460 A.2d 601 (1983); Bisbee v.
John C. Conover Agency, Inc., 186 N.J. Super. 335, 452 A.2d 689 (1982); Nagy v. Bell Tel.
Co., 292 Pa. Super. 24, 436 A.2d 701 (1981); Wolfe v. Arroyo, 543 S.W.2d 11 (Tex. Ct. App.
1976); Jeffers v. City of Seattle, 23 Wash. App. 301, 597 P.2d 899 (1979).
122. Barron, supra note 113, at 878-79.
May 1986] OFFICIOUS INTERMEDDLER
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Restatement provides:
(2) The right of privacy is invaded by
(a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another. . . or
(b) appropriation of the other's name or likeness.., or
(c) unreasonable publicity given to the other's private life.., or
(d) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light
before the public .... 123
The Restatement also followed Prosser's description of the parameters of
those actions.1 24
Rigid adherence to Prosser's analysis, however, is inappropriate. It
is hornbook law that "[t]he law of torts is anything but static, and the
limits of its development are never set. When it becomes clear that the
plaintiff's interests are entitled to legal protection against the conduct of
the defendant, the mere fact that the claim is novel will not of itself oper-
ate as a bar to the remedy."'' 2 5 Among the numerous articles written on
the subject, there is extensive debate about the nature of the privacy
right,12 6 but general agreement that it is an evolving concept. 127 Indeed,
Warren and Brandeis urged the evolution of the law of privacy in their
seminal article. 128 Further, in his 1960 article Prosser recorded the de-
velopment of the right of action, but did not endorse those parameters as
binding or find them universally accepted. 29 Finally, even the Restate-
ment, which was so influenced by Prosser's views, suggests that the out-
lines of the right of action are not fixed. 130
123. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A(2) (1977).
124. Compare id. § 652B (intrusion on seclusion or solitude) with Prosser, supra note 118,
at 389-92 (intrusion on seclusion or solitude); compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 652C (1977) (appropriation of name or likeness) with Prosser, supra note 118, at 401-07
(appropriation of name or likeness).
125. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 112, at 4.
126. Compare Davis, What Do We Mean by "Right to Privacy"?, 4 S.D.L. REV. 1 (1959)
(privacy interest derives from other more meaningful and explicit causes of action) with
Kalven, supra note 118, at 333-35 (failure to identify social values underlying privacy cases
disables courts from formulating appropriate remedies and defenses); compare Posner, Privacy,
Secrecy, and Reputation, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 1 (1979) (privacy entitled to recognition only
when information it protects has economic value to society) with Gavison, supra note 113, at
422-24 (defending privacy as useful, distinct, and coherent concept) and Gerety, Redefining
Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233 (1977) (when properly defined and limited, privacy
is legally viable and necessary).
127. Critics often argue that courts should abandon the existing privacy analysis. See, e.g.,
Kalven, supra note 118, at 326-28. Advocates are quick to concede that "[p]rivacy is a legal
wall badly in need of mending." Gerety, supra note 126, at 233.
128. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 111, at 195-97.
129. Prosser, supra note 118, at 389, 422-23.
130. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A comment c (1977), which
states:
Other forms may still appear, particularly since some courts, and in particular the
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Subsequent sections of this Article discuss the extent to which Baby
Jane Doe, her family, and others like them might state a right of action
against potential defendants within the Restatement framework.131 Also
urged is the minor extension of the right of action to afford the parents a
remedy for the substantial intrusion on their interest in family autonomy.
Baby Jane Doe and the Restatement
Stating a cause of action on behalf of either the infant or her parents
runs into several common problems. For example, in either case, the
prospective plaintiff may have difficulty establishing an intrusion into her
solitude or seclusion for purposes of section 652BI32 or proving the pub-
licity required under section 652D. 133 This Article argues below that the
right of action is sufficiently elastic to encompass the parents' right to
family autonomy. 134 This section of the Article, however, reviews
problems unique to a cause of action on behalf of the infant. It concludes
that the right of privacy would have to evolve too far, too quickly to
provide a basis for a right of action on her behalf.
Section 652B of the second Restatement may be violated by the in-
tentional intrusion "upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his pri-
vate affairs or concerns."1 35 Unlike other subspecies of the action,
section 652B does not require publication of information about the plain-
tiff.1 36 But the interference must be substantial 37 and "of a kind that
would be highly offensive to the ordinary reasonable man."1 38
Obvious examples of an actionable privacy tort include actual physi-
cal intrusions. 39 But the right of action is not so limited. For example,
Supreme Court of the United States, have spoken in very broad general terms of a
somewhat undefined "right of privacy" as a ground for various constitutional deci-
sions involving indeterminate civil and personal rights.... Nothing in this Chapter
is intended to exclude the possibility of future developments in the tort law of
privacy.
131. This Article does not consider the second Restatement of Torts § 652C (appropria-
tion) and § 652E (false light). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652C, 652E (1977).
Those sections are almost certainly inapplicable.
132. See infra notes 135-48, 235-60 & accompanying text.
133. See infra notes 187-91, 299-345 & accompanying text.
134. See infra notes 193-348 & accompanying text.
135. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
136. See id. § 652E comment a ("The form of invasion of privacy covered by [§ 652B]
does not depend upon any publicity given to the person whose interest is invaded or to his
affairs.").
137. Id. § 652B comment d.
138. Id.; see also W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 112, at 855.
139. See, e.g., Young v. Western & A.R. Co., 39 Ga. App. 761, 148 S.E. 414 (1929) (war-
rantless search).
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defendants have been found liable for electronic eavesdropping 40 and
wiretapping, 14' for securing information about another's finances,142 and
for making harassing telephone calls. 143 Importantly, cases have recog-
nized the right of action when a plaintiff's illness instigates the tortious
conduct.144 For example, the Restatement cites the example of a woman,
"sick in a hospital with a rare disease that arouses curiosity," whose pri-
vacy is invaded when a news reporter takes her photograph over her
objection. 45
It may be difficult to prove an invasion in a case like Baby Jane
Doe's: the health care professional who reveals the confidential informa-
tion may have been given permission to collect the information and the
party receiving the information may be unsuccessful in his suit to compel
unwanted treatment. 46 Even on the assumption that this obstacle can
be overcome, a seriously ill newborn is unaware of the intrusion.
Although not expressly made an essential element, awareness of the de-
fendant's intrusion, even if not contemporaneous, 4 7 would seem to be
implicit in the decided cases. 14"
The most serious question is whether damages for an increased life
span are compensable. Courts have recognized the right of seriously ill
140. See, e.g., Roach v. Harper, 143 W. Va. 869, 877, 105 S.E.2d 564, 568 (1958); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B comment b, illustration 3 (1977).
141. See, e.g., Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107, 112, 206 A.2d 239, 242 (1964).
142. See, e.g., Zimmermann v. Wilson, 81 F.2d 847 (3d Cir. 1936).
143. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B comment b, illustration 5 (1977); see also
Harms v. Miami Daily News, 127 So. 2d 715, 717 (Fla. 1961).
144. See Estate of Berthiaume v. Pratt, 365 A.2d 792 (Me. 1976) (physician photographed
patient against his wishes); see also Spring v. Geriatric Auth., 475 N.E.2d 727, 734-35 n.9
(Mass. 1985) (whether there was an invasion of privacy by an unauthorized intrusion into a
senile patient's room was a matter properly decided by the jury) (dicta); RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 652B comment b, illustration 1 (1977).
145. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B comment b, illustration 1 (1977).
146. See infra notes 239-60 & accompanying text. Arguably, Washburn attempted to in-
trude by compelling inappropriate treatment. No treatment was ordered. Thus, Washburn
might attempt to argue that, at most, his attempt to invade Baby Doe's privacy was unsuccess-
ful and therefore not actionable. See, e.g., Gretencord v. Ford Motor Co., 538 F. Supp. 331,
333 (D. Kan. 1982) (no invasion of privacy when employee refuses to submit to search ordered
by employer and no search takes place).
147. Cf. Zimmermann v. Wilson, 81 F.2d 847 (3d Cir. 1936) (improper inquiry into pri-
vate affairs was actionable without contemporaneous knowledge of invasion).
148. See Froelich v. Werbin, 219 Kan. 461, 464-65, 548 P.2d 482, 485 (1976) (no invasion
of privacy when no physical intrusion into secluded place and plaintiff had no contemporane-
ous knowledge of taking of personal property) (alternative holding); cf. RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 42 (1977) (awareness of confinement essential to cause of action for false
imprisonment). Arguably, false imprisonment and invasion of privacy are similar torts in that
plaintiff's awareness is essential to the injury.
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minors to be withdrawn from life support systems.149 For example, in a
case concerning treatment of a mentally retarded adult suffering from
leukemia, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court found a constitu-
tional right to privacy that encompasses a right to die.150 It then ex-
tended that right to incompetent patients by allowing a surrogate to
decide whether treatment is appropriate.151 Because it is similarly im-
possible to determine an infant's views of artificial life-support systems,
the Massachusetts court has equated the substituted judgment test, under
which a surrogate attempts to reach the decision that the incapacitated
person would make if able to choose, 52 with the best interest test in such
cases. I5 3 The court has held that it may be in the best interest of a seri-
ously impaired infant to be withdrawn from a life-support system and to
be allowed to die.' 54
Massachusetts is not alone in recognizing that an incompetent pa-
tient has a right to die under compelling circumstances. 155 For example,
when continued existence is sufficiently burdensome, an unconscious in-
competent patient may be withdrawn from a respirator, 5 6 and a senile
patient may be denied nutrition provided by means of an artificial feeding
device.' 57 But the parties in those cases sought only injunctive or declar-
atory relief; the cases are silent on whether violation of a patient's right
149. See, eg.,In re Guardianship of Barry, 445 So. 2d 365, 371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984);
In re P.V.W, 424 So. 2d 1015, 1020 (La. 1982); Custody of a Minor, 385 Mass. 697, 708-13,
434 N.E.2d 601, 607-10 (1982).
150. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 739, 370
N.E.2d 417, 426 (1977).
151. Id. at 739-40, 370 N.E.2d at 433.
152. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 132.
153. Custody of a Minor, 385 Mass. 697, 716, 434 N.E.2d 601, 609 (1982). The Presi-
dent's Commission defines the best interests test as follows:
[T]he best interests standard does not rest on the value of self-determination but
solely on the protection of the patients' welfare.
In assessing whether a procedure or course of medical treatment would be in the
patient's best interests, the surrogate must take into account such factors as the relief
of suffering, the preservation or restoration of functioning, and the quality as well as
the extent of life sustained. An accurate assessment will encompass consideration of
the satisfaction of present desires, the opportunities for future satisfactions, and the
possibility of developing or regaining the capacity for self-determination.
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 134-36 (footnotes omitted).
154. Custody of a Minor, 385 Mass. 697, 716, 434 N.E.2d 601, 609 (1982).
155. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985) (84-year-old bedridden
woman with serious and irreversible physical and mental impairments and limited life expec-
tancy); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983) (69-year-old comatose patient,
suffering irreversible brain damage and having no chance of resuming meaningful existence).
156. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Barry, 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
157. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
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to die would support an action for damages. 158 Courts are unlikely to
allow such an action. The damages sought are virtually identical to those
almost universally rejected in suits characterized as "wrongful life"
cases. 1
59
Recent medical developments have made possible prenatal or early
pregnancy screening for genetic defects. 160  In the past twenty years,
there have been a number of cases brought by parents of a seriously
defective newborn against their physicians for failing to give them proper
genetic counseling. 16 1
Gleitman v. Cosgrove,162 the first such case, was decided in 1967. In
Gleitman, an infant and his parents sued two physicians, specialists in
obstetrics and gynecology. The basis of their complaint was that the in-
fant's mother contracted German measles during her pregnancy and
that, despite repeated inquiries, the defendants told her that the illness
would have no effect on her child. In fact, the child was born with seri-
ous birth defects. 163 The plaintiff-mother alleged that, had she been prop-
erly informed, she might have aborted the fetus. 164 The plaintiffs
contended that "but for the negligence of defendants, [the infant] would
not have been born to suffer with an impaired body."' 16 5
The court rejected both the parents' and infant's claims. In rejecting
the infant's claim, the court found damages to be incalculable:
158. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Barry, 445 So. 2d 365, 367 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)
(petition for court order authorizing withdrawal of life support); Custody of a Minor, 385
Mass. 697, 699, 434 N.E.2d 601, 602 (1982) (same); In re Hier, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 200, 464
N.E.2d 959 (1984) (order sought to appoint guardian to consent to administration of anti-
psychotic drugs to incompetent patient).
159. The Prosser & Keeton hornbook notes:
The last couple of decades have witnessed the rapid development of tort claims con-
cerning a variety of issues that arise when the tortfeasor's act or omission results in
the birth of an unwanted child .... These actions are now generally referred to as
"wrongful birth" claims, when brought by the parents for their own damages, and
"wrongful life" claims, when brought by or on behalf of the child for the harm of
being born deformed.
W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 112, at 370.
160. See Fraser, Introduction: The Development of Genetic Counseling, in GENETIC
COUNSELING: FACTS, VALUES, AND NORMS (A. Capron ed. 1979).
161. See, e.g., Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895
(1978) (suit based on physician's failure to advise 37-year-old mother who had already given
birth to one deformed child of amniocentesis); Karlsons v. Guerinot, 57 A.D.2d 73, 394
N.Y.S.2d 933, 938 (1977) (same); see also Johnson v. Yeshiva Univ., 42 N.Y.2d 818, 820, 364
N.E.2d 1340, 1341, 396 N.Y.S.2d 647, 648 (1977) (suit based on physician's failure to advise
parents of amniocentesis, a procedure which could have revealed the child's deformity).
162. 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
163. Id. at 25, 227 A.2d at 690.
164. Id. at 26, 227 A.2d at 691.
165. Id. at 28, 227 A.2d at 691.
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The infant plaintiff would have us measure the difference between his
life with defects against the utter void of nonexistence, but it is impos-
sible to make such a determination. This Court cannot weigh the
value of life with impairments against the nonexistence of life itself.1 6 6
In rejecting the parents' claim, the calculation of damages was not the
problem. Instead, the court found that the infant's intangible right to life
outweighed any loss to the parents. 167
As a result of the United States Supreme Court's later decision in
Roe v. Wade, 168 however, courts have begun to recognize a right of ac-
tion on behalf of the parents in similar cases. 169 Once Roe v. Wade under-
cut the public policy argument against abortion, 1 0 denial of recovery
amounted to unjust immunity from liability for the tortfeasing practi-
tioner. 171 Some courts have allowed recovery only for the parents' pecu-
niary losses attendant to the birth of an unwanted child. 172 Other courts
have gone beyond that limited recovery, rejecting the idea that the birth
of an infant is necessarily a benefit, and have allowed damages for emo-
tional distress caused by the birth of the infant.173 Indeed, the New
Jersey Supreme Court reversed a portion of its Gleitman holding in
Berman v. Allan,174 allowing the parents to recover for emotional dis-
tress. Two years later, it extended recovery to include pecuniary
damages. 175
Despite, or perhaps because of,17 6 recognition of an action on behalf
166. Id.
167. Id. at 31, 227 A.2d at 693.
168. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
169. See, e.g., Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471, 474 (7th Cir. 1981); Becker v.
Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 412-15, 386 N.E.2d 807, 813-15, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 901-03 (1978);
Speck v. Finegold, 497 Pa. 77, 83-86, 439 A.2d 110, 113-15 (1981); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis,
Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 465-72, 656 A.2d 483, 488 (1983). The New Jersey Supreme Court
overruled the Gleitman denial of a wrongful birth action. Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 431-
32, 404 A.2d 8, 14 (1979).
170. See Gleitman, 49 N.J. at 30, 227 A.2d at 693 ("substantial policy reasons prevent this
Court from allowing tort damages for the denial of the opportunity to [procure an abortion].").
171. Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421,432, 404 A.2d 8, 14 (1979); see also Comment, Wrong-
fulLife: The Right Not to be Born, 54 TUL. L REv. 480, 488-92 (1980) (discussing tort duties
of physician in such cases).
172. See, e.g., Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471, 478-79 (7th Cir. 1981); Becker v.
Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 412-13, 386 N.E.2d 807, 813, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 901 (1978).
173. See, e.g., Speck v. Finegold, 497 Pa. 77, 88-89, 439 A.2d 110, 116-17 (1981); Naccash
v. Burger, 223 Va. 406, 415-16, 290 S.E.2d 825, 830-31 (1982); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc.,
98 Wash. 2d 460, 477, 656 P.2d 483, 494 (1983). As observed by the New Jersey Supreme
Court, "There is no joy in watching a child suffer and die from cystic fibrosis." Schroeder v.
Perkel, 87 N.J. 53, 69, 432 A.2d 834, 842 (1981).
174. 80 N.J. 421, 431-32, 404 A.2d 8, 14 (1979).
175. Schroeder v. Perkel, 87 N.J. 53, 67-69, 432 A.2d 834, 841-42 (1981).
176. Recognition of a parent's cause of action has the salutary effect of deterring careless
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of an infant's parents, there has been no similar trend towards allowing
the infant a cause of action for wrongful life, no matter how impaired
that life is. In the most recent addition of Prosser's hornbook, the editors
summarized the law through 1983:
With the exception of three lower court decisions subsequently
nullified by the high courts of New York and California, and a close
call in Pennsylvania, all jurisdictions that have ruled on the issue now
follow Gleitman in denying the child a wrongful life cause of action for
general damages for the suffering of being born in an impaired
condition. 177
Courts, however, have begun to recognize a limited right of action
for wrongful life. 178 Procanik v. Cillo, 17 9 like Gleitman, was decided by
the New Jersey Supreme Court and involved an infant born with congen-
ital rubella syndrome. The infant sued in his own right because " 'he has
suffered because of his parents' impaired capacity to cope with his
problems,' and seeks damages for his pain and suffering and for his 'im-
paired childhood.' "180
The court recognized that "a child or his parents may recover spe-
cial damages for extraordinary medical expenses incurred during in-
fancy, and that the infant may recover those expenses during his
majority."' 8 ' But the court adhered to its view "that the infant's claim
for pain and suffering and for a diminished childhood presents insur-
mountable problems."18 2 It again refused to weigh the value of a defec-
tive existence against the value of nonexistence because of the speculative
nature of the damages. 83
Cases like Baby Jane Doe's present an analogous problem. Even if a
court were to find that the staff member's presence or Washburn's inter-
conduct by physicians. At the same time, it allows courts to avoid the hard damage questions
that the court found troubling in Gleitman. See supra notes 166-67 & accompanying text.
177. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 112, at 371. All but two of the cited cases
denied a right of action on behalf of the child in its entirety. Two cited cases denied general
damages but recognized an action limited to the extraordinary costs caused by the child's
defective condition. Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 229, 237, 643 P.2d 954, 959, 964, 182
Cal. Rptr. 337, 342, 347 (1982); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 479-80, 656
P.2d 483, 495 (1983).
178. Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal.Rptr. 337 (1982); Procanik v.
Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 478 A.2d 755 (1984); Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 71 N.C. App. 289, 322 S.E.2d
567 (1984), petition for appeal granted, 313 N.C. 327, 327 S.E.2d 887 (1985); Harbeson v.
Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 479-80, 656 P.2d 483, 495 (1983).
179. 97 N.J. 339, 478 A.2d 755 (1984).
180. Id. at 344, 478 A.2d at 758.
181. Id. at 352, 478 A.2d at 762.
182. Id. at 353, 478 A.2d at 763.
183. Id. at 354, 478 A.2d at 763.
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vention amounted to an intrusion,18 4 it is difficult to find a compensable
injury. The intended effect of those who might intervene on the infant's
behalf is to prolong the infant's life. 185 Although the infant might argue
that prolonging her life might be more burdensome to her than allowing
her to die,186 the damages caused by increasing her life span are analo-
gous to those universally rejected in the wrongful life cases in the sense
that both plaintiffs are alleging that they would be better off if they did
not exist.
A claim under Restatement section 652D would seem to do no bet-
ter. According to the Restatement, a person violates the privacy of an-
other if she "gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of
another... if the matter publicized is of a kind that... would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person, and ... is not of legitimate concern to
the public." 187
As with section 652B, the infant's action under section 652D would
fail for lack of cognizable injury. 88 Prosser identified the interest pro-
tected by this subspecies of the tort as follows:
The interest protected is that of reputation, with the same overtones of
mental distress that are present in libel and slander. It is in reality an
extension of defamation, into the field of publications that do not fall
within the narrow limits of the old torts, with the elimination of the
defense of truth.' 89
As Prosser and Keeton have noted, "When one's reputation is im-
paired, this affects one's relations with others, including business, social,
religious, and family."' 90 Testimony in the Baby Jane Doe case indicated
that she would never achieve meaningful interaction with her environ-
ment. 19' Thus, defamation damages seem singularly inappropriate in a
case in which the plaintiff will never be aware of harm to her reputation
because she is not even aware of having a reputation.
Despite public belief that Baby Jane Doe's interests were harmed by
officious intermeddling by strangers, it is unlikely that a cause of action
for invasion of privacy on her behalf could be brought. Denial of such
184. But see supra notes 140-46 & accompanying text.
185. See Record at 48.
186. Id.
187. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
188. The publicity requirement and the public concern element pose some difficulty for the
infant, as they would for the parents. But a court otherwise moved to afford a remedy for
violation of an identifiable legal interest may overcome those barriers with some support in the
case law. See infra notes 299-337 & accompanying text.
189. Prosser, supra note 118, at 398.
190. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 112, at 843.
191. Record at 46-47.
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an action, however, does not justify intervention by outsiders. It merely
disregards the infant as the injured party. Rather, the infant's parents
are the appropriate plaintiffs in suits against intermeddlers.
Invasion of the Parents' Privacy
There are several reasons why the parents should be able to state a
cause of action against both medical personnel who publicize confidential
information and the stranger who attempts to override the parents' deci-
sion by unauthorized 192 conduct. 193 First, parents have a constitution-
ally-based interest in family autonomy. 94 Absent governmental action,
of course, that is not sufficient to state a cause of action, 195 but it does
illustrate the fundamental importance of the parents' asserted interest.
Second, although no appellate court has applied or rejected an action
against an intermeddler like Washburn based on sections 652B and
652D, a review of the relevant case law suggests that the parameters of
the tort are unsettled. 196 Rigid adherence to some of the elements of the
tort does present obstacles for the parents as plaintiffs. In light of the
fundamental interest asserted and the relative infancy of the action, how-
ever, courts should extend the right of action to encompass such suits.
Third, because there is no adequate justification for the conduct of inter-
meddlers, extension of this privacy tort is especially warranted to avoid
allowing an injury to the plaintiff to go unremedied.
As indicated above, parental autonomy rights are not, and should
not be, absolute. 97 The law must test whether those rights conflict with
192. Unauthorized conduct refers to unprivileged conduct. In contrast, reporting the par-
ents' decision to withhold treatment to a state agency is authorized by state law and is justified
as a balance between the potentially competing interests of the parents and the child.
193. A similar analysis may apply in other instances in which right-to-life members at-
tempt to harass a pregnant woman into changing her decision to have an abortion, a practice
of some right-to-life advocates. See C. PAIGE, supra note 42, at 75. The injury would be to the
woman's exercise of her right to make a choice free from intrusion by strangers. Other actions,
such as intentional infliction of emotional distress, also may be applicable. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
194. See infra notes 217-26 & accompanying text.
195. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (federal cause
of action implied when federal agents violated plaintiff's fourth amendment rights); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1982) (right of action against defendant acting under color of state law for violation of
person's constitutional rights).
196. See, e.g., Zimmerman, supra note 112, at 293 (arguing that confusion exists as to
contours of tort); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A comment c (1977)
(other forms of invasion of privacy may still appear). Not only may forms of invasion increase,
but within recognized forms of the action specific elements are subject to debate or expansion.
See, e.g., id., § 652D comment a (uncertain whether courts will make actionable disclosure not
equivalent to giving of publicity to a private matter).
197. See supra notes 33-35 & accompanying text.
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the interests of the infant or the state198 through the established proce-
dures for reporting suspected instances of abuse. 199 Consequently, after
the appropriate state agency finds the complaint groundless, unauthor-
ized suits by strangers, no matter how nobly motivated, should be tor-
tious because the suitor cannot claim that the child's or state's interest
justifies further interference with the parents' right to autonomy. While
our litigious society is hesitant to punish a suitor,200 there is no absolute
privilege to bring a lawsuit. Thus, courts have recognized rights of ac-
tion2°1 or sanctions202 when filing the lawsuit caused the plaintiff's injury.
Constitutional Privacy
Despite almost universal recognition of a right of privacy, 20 3 the pa-
rameters of the tort and its relationship to constitutionally protected pri-
vacy continue to generate extensive scholarly debate. 2 4 The United
States Supreme Court,2 05 Congress, 20 6 and state courts20 7 have all recog-
nized privacy as a distinct interest worthy of legal protection. At the
same time, as observed by Professor Gavison, much of the scholarly liter-
198. See Smith, supra note 6, at 776-79.
199. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-38a to -38c (West Supp. 1985) (duty to
report; immunity); IND. CODE. ANN. § 31-6-11-3 (Bums 1980) (duty to report); id. § 31-6-11-
7 (Burns Supp. 1985) (qualified immunity); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 419 (McKinney Supp.
1986); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-403 (Supp. 1985) (duty to report); id. § 37-1-409'
(confidentiality).
200. See, e.g., Limerick v. Greenwald, 749 F.2d 97, 101 (1st Cir. 1984) (The court ob-
served that "[d]espite exploding caseloads we have been very reluctant to enter sanctions for
frivolous or vexatious appeals because we do not wish to chill the right to appeal.").
201. See, e.g., Lampos v. Bazer, Inc., 270 Or. 256, 527 P.2d 376 (1974) (malicious prose-
cution); Garland v. Wilson, 289 Pa. 272, 137 A. 266 (1927) (abuse of process).
202. See, eg., Tatum v. Regents of the Univ. of Neb., 462 U.S. 1117 (1983) (damages
awarded for frivolous appeal pursuant to Sup. CT. R. 49.2); Hagerty v. Succession of Clement,
749 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 333 (1985) (court imposed sanctions for
bringing frivolous appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982)). Section 1927 provides "Any
attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States or any
Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously
may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs."
203. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 112, at 851; see also Zimmerman, supra note
111, at 365-67 app. (status of cause of action for all American jurisdictions).
204. See supra notes 126-30 & accompanying text.
205. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-56 (1973) (upholding woman's right to
privacy to procure an abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965) (up-
holding married couple's right to privacy to obtain contraceptive).
206. See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982).
207. See, e.g., Home v. Patton, 291 Ala. 701, 287 So. 2d 824 (1973); Estate of Berthiaume
v. Pratt, 365 A.2d 792 (Me. 1976); Alberts v. Devine, 479 N.E.2d 113, 119-21 (Mass.), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 546 (1985) (remedy provided for doctor's breach of patient's confidences and
for inducement of breach by third party). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 652A-652D (1977) (principles of invasion of privacy).
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ature on privacy suggests that when we examine cases finding a right to
privacy, "we always find that some other interest has been involved. '20 8
Those commentators argue that when no other separate interest is in-
volved, "privacy itself is never protected. '20 9
Professor Gavison has argued in favor of a distinct and coherent
theory of privacy and is critical of those commentators who reduce pri-
vacy to other legally recognized interests. 2 10 She has argued that Pros-
ser's analysis of privacy was "reductionist" 2 11 and that "[s]ome cases,
frequently discussed in privacy terms, cannot be included under [the four
Restatement] categories without straining them and weakening their
power of description and guidance. ' 21 2 According to Gavison, one fail-
ure of Prosser's analysis is that it is uncertain whether it "accommo-
date[s] the constitutional right to privacy decisions because [it] does not
have a category for noninterference. '21 3
Absent governmental action, a constitutional right to privacy is not
implicated in a case like Baby Jane Doe's. 2 14 Thus the federal civil action
for deprivation of rights, section 1983,215 and cases creating constitu-
208. Gavison, supra note 113, at 422. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 126, at 7-8 (defamation
and invasion of privacy protect hurt feelings); id. at 9-10 (privacy action protects only interests
now protected by recently expanded property interests like property rights in collection of
news); id. at 12 (intrusion upon one's seclusion is a form of trespass).
209. Id. According to Professor Gavison, "[tihe concept of privacy as a concern for lim-
ited accessibility enables us to identify when losses of privacy occur." Id. at 423. She asserts
that "the reasons for which we claim privacy in different situations are similar [, that is,] the
promotion of liberty, autonomy, selfhood, and human relations, and furthering the existence of
a free society." Id. Because of the similarity of those reasons, Gavison contends that "the
legal system should make an explicit commitment to privacy as a value that should be consid-
ered in reaching legal results." Id. at 424.
210. Id. at 422.
211. Id. at 460 n.118.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. The constitutional privacy issue might arise if a state or federal authority attempted
to compel treatment in violation of a patient's constitutionally protected right to privacy. For
a fuller argument on this point, see Vitiello, supra note 9, at 154-59 (arguing that infants have a
constitutional right to be treated consistent with their best interests, which may dictate with-
drawal of treatment).
Particularly in light of the thesis of this Article, it is interesting to note that Brandeis was
instrumental in bringing a right to privacy into constitutional adjudication, just as he was in
urging it as a right of action under state tort law. For example, in his dissent in Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (wiretapping), Justice Brandeis advocated a broad reading
of the fourth amendment to protect privacy. Id. at 476-78 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). There
was, he argued, a "right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men." Id. at 478.
215. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) (creating right of action against defendant acting under color
of state law for deprivation of a person's rights secured by federal law).
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tional torts216 are inapplicable. The case law governing family autonomy
demonstrates, however, that there is a recognized interest of the parents
in making decisions on behalf of their infants.
Although the Supreme Court's privacy analysis in its various con-
texts is not entirely consistent,217 it has regularly protected matters relat-
ing to family autonomy. For example, in Meyer v. Nebraska2 18 the
Court, based on the parents' liberty to make educational decisions,219
rejected a state's efforts to make illegal the teaching of a language other
than English. Early cases like Meyer and Pierce v. Society of Sisters,220
which relied on Meyer in upholding parental liberty rights to direct the
upbringing of their children, reflect the then-fashionable substantive due
process analysis221 rather than a right to privacy analysis. Nonetheless,
they do show judicial deference to parental rights regarding family
matters.222
More recent cases involving marriage,223 contraception,2 24 and abor-
tion225 support the idea that family autonomy is at the core of the right
to privacy cases. The Court has held that the right to privacy embraces
"personal decisions relating to marriage... procreation... contracep-
tion ... family relationships... and child rearing and education. '226
Parental autonomy is not absolute. The Supreme Court refused
long ago to allow parents "to make martyrs of their children, ' 227 and
216. See, e.g., Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) (damage remedy implied under due
process clause of the fifth amendment); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388
(1971) (damage remedy implied under fourth amendment).
217. Compare Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (limiting states' right to regu-
late married couples' sexual conduct) and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (limiting
states' right to regulate unmarried individuals' heterosexual conduct) with Bowers v. Hard-
wick, 54 U.S.L.W. 4919 (U.S. June 30, 1986) (No. 85-140) (upholding states' right to criminal-
ize homosexual conduct).
218. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
219. Id. at 400.
220. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
221. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
735 (2d ed. 1983); see also PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 131.
222. More recently, the Supreme Court characterized Meyer and Pierce as privacy cases in
Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977).
223. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (right to marry without court
order); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (indigent's right to obtain divorce); Loving
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (limitations on interracial marriage).
224. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
225. See, e.g., H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (upholding Utah statute requiring
notice to parents of minor child's decision to have an abortion). But see Planned Parenthood
v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (spouse cannot veto wife's decision to abort her fetus).
226. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977) (quoting Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973)).
227. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) ("Parents may be free to be-
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thus has held that parental autonomy does not allow a guardian to en-
courage a child to work in violation of child labor laws.228 Similarly, the
Supreme Court limited parental autonomy rights when it held that par-
ents cannot refuse consent to compulsory vaccinations, even when their
objections are religiously based.229 Consistent with such authority cur-
tailing parental autonomy, courts have intervened in cases in which par-
ents have denied their children life-saving medical treatment. 230 It is
clear that the state as parens patriae231 can compel appropriate medical
treatment.
Some commentators who advocate aggressive treatment for seri-
ously ill minors give short shrift to a right of parental decision-making in
such cases. 232 Parental rights, however, have a proper place in the analy-
sis of the treatment cases: parents should be the appropriate decision-
makers, absent a compelling state interest in preventing child abuse or
neglect.233 When the state compels treatment, it does so under its his-
toric parens patriae function. In contrast, an intermeddler who seeks to
overturn a parental nontreatment decision is a self-appointed champion
come martyrs themselves. But it does not follow that they are free... to make martyrs of their
children ....").
228. Id. at 170-71.
229. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
230. See, e.g., Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash.
1967), aff'd per curiam, 390 U.S. 598 (1968); Mannis v. State, 240 Ark. 42, 398 S.W.2d 206,
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 972 (1966); People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d
769, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 874 (1952); State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962); see
also Annot., 30 A.L.R.2D 1138 (1953).
231. "Parens patriae jurisdiction is a right of sovereignty and imposes a duty on the
sovereignty to protect the public interest and ... such persons with disabilities who
have no rightful protector.... [It] extends to the personal liberty of persons who are
under a disability whether by reason of infancy, incompetency, habitual drunkenness,
imbecility, etc."
Johnson v. State, 18 N.J. 422, 430, 114 A.2d 1, 5 (1955).
232. See, e.g., Bopp, Protection of Disabled Newborns: Are There Constitutional Limita-
tions?, 1 IssuEs IN L. & MED. 173, 177-93 (1985); Robertson, supra note 19 at 255-59; Smith,
supra note 6, at 776-79. In these commentators' view, as long as the infant suffers a life-
threatening condition, the state interest is enough to outweigh parental rights. Reliance is
usually placed on cases like those cited supra at note 230. This author has argued that it is
inappropriate to accept mechanically precedent developed prior to the extraordinary recent
developments in medical technology. See Vitiello, supra note 9, at 135-36.
233. In light of the state's interest, parents cannot object to an appropriate investigation by
proper state agencies into whether child abuse is occurring. Neglect and abuse statutes exist in
every state and create a duty to provide medical assistance for helpless minor children. Rob-
ertson, supra note 19, at 218, 222. Those statutes are obviously a proper exercise of states'
parens patriae function. A finding of no abuse, for example, when the parental decision is
reasonable, should prevent the state from ordering treatment. Id. at 235-37 (defense to neglect
proceeding that care would be extraordinary).
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of an infant's "right" to treatment and does not possess analogous au-
thority to act on an infant's behalf.
In sum, parental autonomy is sufficiently fundamental to warrant
constitutional protection.234 This fundamental right should be vindi-
cated in state jurisprudence by the recognition of a privacy action on the
parents' behalf.
Restatement Section 652B:235 Intrusion Upon Seclusion
To state a cause of action under section 652B, a plaintiff must prove
that the defendant intentionally intruded upon his seclusion or private
affairs. 236 The intrusion must be highly offensive to the reasonable per-
son.237 Furthermore, the invasion must be to the plaintiff's personal
rights and cannot be asserted derivatively. 238
Intentional Intrusion
Cases like Baby Jane Doe's appear most often to be initiated by a
member of the medical staff of the hospital caring for the infant.239 In at
least one case, people seeking to compel treatment made an unauthorized
entry into the patient's room.24° That apparently did not occur in the
Baby Jane Doe case.241 If the hospital employee, turned informant, had
permission to examine the patient, it is difficult to find a sufficient intru-
sion to justify a right of action on behalf of the infant based on informa-
tion gathering. Further, the parents could not argue that examination of
their infant gave them a right of action because courts have not allowed
234. Interestingly, the federal district court in American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heck-
ler, 561 F. Supp. 395 (D.D.C. 1983), aff'd sub nom., Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 106 S.
Ct. 2101 (1986), noted that the original Infant Doe regulations promulgated under § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act might in some cases infringe upon parental rights. Id. 400, 403.
235. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. It is black letter law that even a close relative may not recover for the invasion of
privacy of another person. See, e.g., Wood v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 736 F.2d 1084, 1093
(5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 783 (1985); Coverstone v. Davies, 38 Cal. 2d 315, 322-
24, 239 P.2d 876, 880-81 (1952); Nelson v. Times, 373 A.2d 1221, 1225 (Me. 1977); Lambert v.
Garo, 484 N.E.2d 260, 263 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985). But see Viscovo v. New Way Enters., Ltd.,
60 Cal. App. 3d 582, 587-88, 130 Cal. Rptr. 86, 89 (1976) (plaintiff's privacy invaded along
with invasion of her parents' privacy).
239. See J. LYON, supra note 16, at 46 (identifying person who contacted Washburn only
as member of the hospital staff). In the Spring case, discussed supra notes 87-88 & accompany-
ing text, members of the medical staff published their dissent in a local paper. Spring v. Geri-
atric Auth., 475 N.E.2d 727, 729 (Mass. 1985).
240. Spring v. Geriatric Auth., 475 N.E.2d 727, 729 (Mass. 1985).
241. J. LYON, supra note 16, at 46.
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that right to be raised derivatively. 242
Section 652B, however, is not limited to physical invasions of pri-
vacy. For example, it has been extended to cases involving eavesdrop-
ping243 and harassing phone calls.244 Section 652B is designed to protect
the plaintiffs interest in "his private affairs or concerns. ' 245 Tort law
also protects intangible rights from unwarranted interference, 246 even
when that interference is other than physical invasion.247
Thus, it is critical to examine the nature both of the interference and
of the right to be protected. The parents in a case like Baby Jane Doe's
would assert their cause of action based upon their personal right to
make decisions on behalf of their infant.248 That right is personal, not
derivative. 249 Once the nature of the right is clearly identified, it is easier
to understand the alleged intrusion.
Defendants in the Baby Jane Doe case were motivated by a desire to
compel treatment.250 They would not be able to defend against an inva-
sion of privacy action by asserting that their interference should not be
242. See, e.g., Wood v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 736 F.2d 1084, 1093 (5th Cir. 1984);
Coverstone v. Davies, 38 Cal. 2d 315, 322-24, 239 P.2d 876, 880-81 (1952).
243. See, e.g., Roach v. Harper, 143 W. Va. 869, 876-77, 105 S.E.2d 564, 568 (1958) (land-
lord eavesdropping on tenant through listening device); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 652B comment b, illustration 3 (1977).
244. See, e.g., Hames v. Miami Daily News, 127 So. 2d 715 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961)
(newspaper prompted harassing calls to plaintiff by publishing that she had sexy voice); see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B comment b, illustration 5 (1977).
245. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
246. See, e.g., Holcombe v. Whitaker, 294 Ala. 430, 318 So. 2d 289 (1975) (jury question
whether threat was sufficient to arouse an apprehension of harm); State Rubbish Collectors
Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952) (adopting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
§ 46 (1965), giving a right of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress); W. PROS-
SER & W. KEETON, supra note 112, at 43 (action for assault protects individual's interest in
freedom from apprehension of harm).
247. See, e.g., Harms v. Miami Daily News, 127 So. 2d 715 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961)
(jury question whether telephone calls were actionable); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 652B comment b, illustration 5 (1977) (harassing phone calls give right of action).
248. See supra notes 203-34 & accompanying text. In a related context, the President's
Commission observed that "[t]he family deserves recognition as an important social unit that
ought to be treated, within limits, as a responsible decision-maker in matters that intimately
affect its members." PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 128.
249. It is important to recognize that the parents would not be able to contend that the
injury was an attempt to secure treatment for the infant. That claimed right would be deriva-
tive. Furthermore, Washburn was unsuccessful in those efforts. Thus, if that were the only
claimed injury, the action might be dismissed because unsuccessful attempts to invade privacy
are not actionable. See Gretencord v. Ford Motor Co., 538 F. Supp. 331, 333 (D. Kan. 1982)
(having prevented the act, plaintiff cannot sue for damage resulting from the act); supra note
146 & accompanying text.
250. See 60 Minutes, supra note 37, at 2.
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actionable because they failed to achieve that goal.251 In order to achieve
their goal, they had to alter or overrule the parents' decision to refuse
treatment. 252 To accomplish this, both the hospital staff member and
Washburn intentionally intruded upon the parents' right to make a deci-
sion on behalf of their newborn. Washburn brought law suits in state253
and federal court254 to coerce treatment. This tortious conduct was com-
plete upon the interference, not upon a final decision by the parents or
the court. Consequently, Baby Jane Doe's parents were directly im-
paired in their ability to make their decision free from unauthorized in-
tervention. The interference was both psychological, as demonstrated by
the parents' statements to the media,255 and physical, as evidenced by
their need to appear in court to justify their decision. 256
The staff member's intrusive conduct was less direct, but also action-
able. Presumably, the staff member notified Washburn in the hope that
Washburn would intervene by filing a suit to compel treatment.257 Thus,
the staff member would be a joint tortfeasor with Washburn on the the-
ory that he acted in concert with Washburn. 258
Unlike Baby Jane Doe, her parents were acutely aware of the intru-
sion.259 A right of action that is flexible enough to protect "a lady of
social prominence" from a photographer's repeated phone calls made to
251. See Gretencord v. Ford Motor Co., 538 F. Supp. 331 (D. Kan. 1982) (unsuccessful
attempts not actionable).
252. The defendants might have argued that they did not intend to invade the parents'
seclusion and that they intended solely to compel treatment for the minor. But, as with other
intentional torts, specific intent is not required. Instead, intent is shown when defendants
know to a substantial certainty that harm would result. See, e.g., Garratt v. Dailey, 46 Wash.
2d 197, 201, 279 P.2d 1091, 1093 (1955). The Baby Jane Doe defendants could not have
plausibly denied that they knew their conduct would interfere with the parents' choice of
treatment.
253. Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 95 A.D.2d 587, 467 N.Y.S.2d 685, aff'd, 60 N.Y.2d
208, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1983).
254. See Saving Baby Jane From Her Saviors, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1984, at A24, col. 1.
255. 60 Minutes, supra note 37, at 4 (statement of father that "[i]t was very, very frighten-
ing to hear that-that a total stranger could force us into a state supreme court to answer to
our decision-making").
256. See J. LYON, supra note 16, at 48-49 (describing father's appearance in court, includ-
ing his testimony "behind a screen, as if he were a Mafia informant").
257. That inference is much stronger if the staff member were also the person who con-
tacted the state child protection service and was unsuccessful in getting that agency to proceed
against the parents.
258. See, e.g., Bierczinski v. Rogers, 239 A:2d 218 (Del. 1968) (defendant who engaged in
drag race acted in concert with other driver despite absence of express agreement); W. PROS-
SER & W. KEETON, supra note 112, at 322-23 (discussing joint liability of tortfeasors acting in
concert).
259. See 60 Minutes, supra note 37.
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persuade her to be photographed 260 should be broad enough to protect
parents who are dragged into court to justify a difficult decision, constitu-
tionally entrusted to them.
Offensiveness
To be actionable, the intrusion also must be "highly offensive to a
reasonable person."'261 Whether the intrusion in the Baby Jane Doe case
was offensive has generated considerable debate. Village Voice journalist
Nat Hentoff, for example, portrayed Washburn's efforts in a favorable
light:
[E]verybody gives Mr. Washburn a hard time, from editorial writers to
[New York's] Court of Appeals to the Federal Judge in Albany who
fined him $500 for harassment because Washburn has brought so
many court actions on behalf of this handicapped infant when he isn't
even a member of the family, for God's sake. The nerve of this in-
truder-trying to preserve the infant's rights as a "person" under the
Constitution by trying to get an independent advocate appointed for
her so that she might have a chance to live longer and with a brighter
mind than is likely under the conservative treatment chosen by her
parents. A terrible man huh? Actually, he's become one of my
heroes.26
2
Most editorial comment was to the contrary. Political commentators
along a broad spectrum condemned efforts to compel treatment. 263 The
staid Wall Street Journal's position was representative of most of the
media:
Our position is that, unlike Mr. Washburn and the federal busy bodies,
we do not presume to know what is the "moral" decision in each of
these tragedies [when denial of treatment leads to the death of a se-
verely impaired infant]. Someone has to decide, which means that
someone will make mistakes.... [W]e do not want the decision made
by some bureaucrat or some coven of lawyers. The inevitable agony
will be much less if these decisions, and any mistakes, are left to the
families involved .... 264
Another writer observed that "[s]elf-righteous private parties seek-
ing to intervene should be given even less encouragement [than the gov-
ernment] to do S0. '"265 Richard Cohen of the Washington Post was
similarly critical of ideologues who attempted to compel treatment.266
The law, like the society it governs, finds intrusion offensive in simi-
260. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B comment b, illustration 5 (1977).
261. Id. § 652B.
262. Hentoff, supra note 54, at 100.
263. See supra note 28.
264. Big Brother Doe, Wall Street J., October 31, 1983, at 24, col. 1.
265. Pike, Reagan Should Honor His Pledge, N.Y Times, Nov. 18, 1983.
266. Cohen, supra note 28.
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lar cases. There are numerous cases in which defendants have been
found liable for misusing medical information about a person's health.267
For example, defendants have been found liable for taking unauthorized
photographs of a patient, even though the photographs were sought for
use in medical instruction;268 for writing a book including the plaintiff's
psychological case study, including revelations of her intimate fantasies
and biographical detail sufficient to identify her;269 and for inducing a
physician to reveal the plaintiff's medical records.27 0 These cases demon-
strate that courts view as reasonable an expectation that medical infor-
mation will not be revealed without the patient's consent, and that
failure to honor that confidence is sufficiently offensive to be actionable.
Other areas of the law demonstrate the special status afforded medi-
cal information. For example, medical records are exempted from dis-
closure under the Privacy Act of 1974.271 Professional licensing
statutes272 and other state laws, such as those enacting a patient's bill of
rights, 273 require confidentiality by health care personnel concerning all
of a patient's records and communications. Finally, the vast majority of
states recognize an evidentiary privilege for physician-patient communi-
cation.274 Most states extend the privilege to all information obtained by
267. See, ag., Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 799 (N.D.
Ohio 1965) (physician breaches duty to patient when he speaks to lawyer about patient's con-
dition prior to patient suing for malpractice); Home v. Patton, 291 Ala. 701, 709-10, 287 So.
2d 824, 830-31 (1973) (plurality opinion) (doctor revealed to employer plaintiff's nervous
disorder).
268. See, ag., Bazemore v. Savannah Hosp., 171 Ga. 257, 262, 155 S.E. 194, 197 (1930);
Estate of Berthiaume v. Pratt, 365 A.2d 792, 795-96 (Me. 1976).
269. Doe v. Roe, 93 Misc. 2d 201, 211-14, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668, 675-77 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977);
see also Berry v. Moench, 8 Utah 2d 191, 331 P.2d 814 (1958) (court remanded for determina-
tion whether psychiatrist abused conditional protection of third person privilege when he re-
vealed information about plaintiff's psychiatric treatment to a family of a woman about to
marry plaintiff).
270. See, e.g., Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 803-04 (N.D.
Ohio 1965).
271. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (1982) (conditions of disclosure).
272. See, e.g., Rules of Board of Regents, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. VIII, § 29.1(b)(8) (1979)
(unprofessional conduct includes "revealing of personally identifiable facts, data or informa-
tion obtained in a professional capacity without the prior consent of the patient .... ).
273. See, eg., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. I11, § 70E (West Supp. 1985) (Patients'
Rights Statute); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.651 (West Supp. 1985) (Patients' Bill of Rights).
274. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 34-26-2 (Supp. 1980) (psychiatrist-psychologist and patient
privilege placed on same basis as attorney-client privilege); CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 990-1007
(West 1966 & Supp. 1983) (governing physician and psychotherapist-patient privilege); DEL.
UNIFORM R. EVID. 503 (1980) (same); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3734(B) (West Supp. 1985)
(privileged communications between health-care provider and patient; applicable in civil
cases); id. § 15:476 (West 1981) (physician-patient privilege applicable in criminal cases); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-22.1 to -22.9 (West 1976); see also C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE 244 n.5 (3d ed. 1984) (noting that at least 40 states recognize the privilege).
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the doctor through observation and examination, not merely to commu-
nications. 27 5 That privilege is extended to include any person, such as a
nurse, who is "present as a needed and customary participant in the con-
sultation. ' 276 Thus, the rules of evidence protect medical information
from disclosure despite the resultant frustration to the strong policy of
truth-finding at trial.27 7 The special treatment traditionally accorded
medical information demonstrates its attendant high level of privacy and
confidentiality; it follows, therefore, that its misuse is offensive to reason-
able people.
Extent to Which Conduct is Privileged
In the foregoing analysis, one form of intrusion was the misuse of
the court system to interfere with the parents' right to make decisions
regarding their child.2 78 Right-to-life advocates have sometimes used
other more direct means of persuasion.2 7 9 But insofar as the analysis has
focused on litigation as tortious, it is necessary to address the extent to
which such conduct may be privileged.
Ours is obviously a litigious society. Indeed, many of our rules of
law facilitate litigation. For example, American jurisdictions generally
do not require losing parties to pay opposing counsel's fees;280 indigent
criminal defendants must be afforded counsel at trial2 8' and on appeal;
28 2
indigents cannot be barred from the courthouse based on their inability
to pay certain fees; 2 8 3 and contingency fees are widely accepted as a ne-
275. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 274, at 248-49.
276. Id. at 250.
277. Id. at 249 (discussing the competing policy of "holding all privileges within reason-
able bounds since they cut off access to sources of truth").
278. See supra notes 248-58 & accompanying text.
279. See, e.g., C. PAIGE, supra note 42, at 75 (right-to-life members entered abortion clinic
to dissuade pregnant women from aborting their fetuses).
280. See Guardian Trust Co. v. Kansas City S. Ry., 28 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1928) (discuss-
ing narrow circumstances in which equity may order payment of attorneys' fees). This rule
has been modified by statute in some specific cases where, for example, the legislature wants to
discourage litigation and to encourage settlement of claims. See, e.g., West v. French, 51 Or.
App. 143, 150-51, 625 P.2d 144, 148 (1981); see also W. PROSSER, J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 552 (7th ed. 1981).
281. See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (indigent's right to appointed
counsel whenever accused is sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment); Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (indigent defendants in state courts have same right to appointed
counsel as defendants in federal courts).
282. See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (indigent's right to appointed
counsel on an appeal).
283. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (indigent's right to obtain di-
vorce requires waiver of filing fees); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 261, § 27.B (West 1980)
(providing for waiver of court costs in specified cases upon proof of indigency); see also Har-
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cessity to secure plaintiffs' rights in personal injury cases.284 Even when
making actionable an improperly motivated law suit, the law has given
the suitor "a large degree of freedom to make mistakes and misjudgments
without being subjected to liability. '"285
However favored, the right to bring suit is not absolute. Tort law
has long recognized a right of action for malicious prosecution 28 6 and
abuse of process.2 7 Frustrated with frivolous litigation, federal courts
have increased use of sanctions against attorneys under Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.288 In 1983, Rule 11, which requires an
attorney to sign pleadings and motions filed in federal court, was
amended, most importantly, to ensure "the availability of an appropriate
sanction even if the violation cannot be shown to have been wilful. '289
Thus, suits improperly brought may be actionable.290
Suits brought by intermeddlers also should be actionable in a Baby
Jane Doe context. Tort law is designed to protect legally identifiable
interests. Here, the parents have a constitutionally protected right to
make a decision on behalf of their infant. Admittedly, that right may
yield to a sufficiently compelling interest of the state or the infant, but
state legislatures strike that balance through procedures to investigate
unlawful parental conduct. A state agency's determination to uphold the
parents' treatment decision should be final and should not provide
grounds for any additional interference with the parents' right to make
that decision. The noble motives or deep-seated convictions of private
suitors cannot act as counterweights to the parents' privacy rights.
There is no reason to shield intermeddlers when they invade these rights
through improper resort to the judicial process.
rington v. Tibbet, 143 Cal. 78, 76 P. 816 (1904); Sutor v. Wood, 76 Tex. 403, 13 S.W. 321
(1890).
284. See W. PROSSER, J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 280, at 552-53; see also
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-20 (1982); MODEL RULES OF PRO-
FESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(c) (1983).
285. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 112, at 871.
286. See, eg., Lampos v. Bazar, Inc., 270 Or. 256, 527 P.2d 376 (1974); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 653 (1977).
287. See, e.g., Nienstadt v. Wetzel, 133 Ariz. 348, 651 P.2d 876 (1982); Candy v. Maxwell,
9 Misc. 2d 329, 169 N.Y.S.2d 547 (1957); Garland v. Wilson, 289 Pa. 272, 275, 137 A. 266,
267-68 (1927); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 682 (1977).
288. FED. R. CIv. P. 11; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982) (allowing assessment of excess
costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees caused by bringing of frivolous lawsuit).
289. FED R. CIv. P. 11, comment a to 1983 Amendments. Some states also have adopted
similar provisions. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 128.5 (West 1982); FLA. CODE CIV.
PROC. § 1-109 (West Supp. 1985) (making false verification of pleadings a crime).
290. See supra notes 248-58 & accompanying text.
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Restatement Section 652D: Publicity Given to Private Life
In addition to an action for intrusion upon seclusion of the parents
under section 652B, parents also may have a cause of action based on
section 652D.291 A plaintiff may state a cause of action under section
652D if the defendant "gives publicity to a matter concerning the [plain-
tiff's] private life.., if the matter publicized is of a kind that.., would
be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and ... is not of legitimate
concern to the public. ' 292 The most substantial problem for plaintiffs in
cases like Baby Jane Doe's will be the publicity requirement.
As with section 652B, 293 plaintiffs will be able to establish that reve-
lation of medical information is highly offensive within the meaning of
section 652D. For example, the Restatement cites the following as an
example of highly offensive conduct: A agrees to allow B to film A's
cesarian delivery for exhibition to medical students for educational pur-
poses. B invades A's privacy when he exhibits the film to the public.
294
As discussed above,295 plaintiffs must allege revelation of facts about
their own private lives; the action cannot be raised derivatively.
Although that distinction has not always been followed carefully, 296 it
does not prevent the parents from asserting a personal right in the Baby
Jane Doe context. 297 To maintain a cause of action under section 652D,
the parents would allege that facts about them were revealed suggesting
that they had improperly withheld appropriate medical care, and in ef-
fect, suggesting that they were committing infanticide. 298 It cannot be
291. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
292. Id.
293. See supra notes 261-77 & accompanying text.
294. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D comment c, illustration 11 (1977). Ob-
viously, a litigant cannot recover when a defendant reveals facts that are a matter of public
record, or that already have been revealed to the public. Id. comment b; see also Bisbee v.
John C. Conover Agency, 186 N.J. Super. 335, 452 A.2d 689 (1982) (disseminated information
of homebuyer was all public information). But few would assert that a hospitalized patient,
although seen by hospital personnel, has not thereby given up her right to privacy. See RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D comment b, illustration 7 (1977).
295. See supra notes 248-58 & accompanying text.
296. See, e.g., Bazemore v. Savannah Hosp., 171 Ga. 257, 155 S.E. 194 (1930) (photograph
of deceased infant created right of action on behalf of the parents).
297. As argued above, Baby Jane Doe's parents have autonomy rights at stake in making a
decision on her behalf. Here, they also have personal privacy rights at stake. There may be
cases, however, where family members may be able to assert privacy rights only derivatively.
For example, facts revealed might concern a conscious, competent patient who refuses to ac-
cept life-saving treatment. Family members may feel aggrieved, but they would not have per-
sonal rights at stake-they are not the decision-makers and the revealed information is not
about them.
298. Some members of the right-to-life movement have said that such cases are infanticide.
See, e.g., AMERICANS UNITED FOR LIFE LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, supra note 10, at 10; Rue,
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contended seriously that facts about the parents' decision-making in such
a case do not relate to their own private lives.
The publicity requirement can be readily proven in some cases in
which the member of the hospital staff or an intermeddler like Washburn
tries his case in the media.299 In other situations, however, in which an
intermeddler makes no effort to involve the media, the publicity element
is more difficult to establish.
Comments to section 652D make clear that "publicity," unlike
"publication" for purposes of defamation, means that the matter is made
public "by communicating it to the public at large, or to so many persons
that the matter must be regarded as substantially certain to become one
of public knowledge. ' ' 30° Many courts have applied that requirement
strictly in order to deny a plaintiff a right of action. 301 For example, an
incorrect report concerning a plaintiff's credit rating was not actionable
in Polin v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. 302 because it was made to only seven-
teen of the defendant's subscribers who had agreed not to give the infor-
mation to others.30 3 Because the data had not yet been made public, the
court denied recovery,3°4 perhaps naively presuming that it would not be
made public.
Courts are not uniform in their interpretation of the meaning of the
publicity requirement. Although the Restatement found publicity re-
quired communication to the public at large,305 it recognized that
"courts may decide to extend the coverage to simple disclosure. ' 30 6 Sev-
eral cases have followed that suggestion, 30 7 leading one commentator to
observe that there is now "considerable doubt about the necessity of a
Death by Design of Handicapped Newborns: The Family's Role & Response, 1 IssuES IN L. &
MED. 201, 204-08 (1985) (discussing "neonaticide").
299. See, e.g., 60 Minutes, supra note 37.
300. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D comment a (1977).
301. See, e.g., Tureen v. Equifax, Inc., 571 F.2d 411, 419 (8th Cir. 1978) (information was
not sufficiently disseminated to public); Barr v. Arco Chem. Corp., 529 F. Supp. 1277, 1280
(S.D. Tex. 1982) (no third party heard tape recording); Beard v. Akzona, Inc., 517 F. Supp
128, 132-33 (E.D. Tenn. 1981) (insufficient to communicate only to small group); Brown v.
Mullarkey, 632 S.W.2d 507, 509-10 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (disclosure was only to attorneys);
Corcoran v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 572 S.W.2d 212, 214-15 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (disclo-
sure to ex-daughter-in-law was not public disclosure); Nagy v. Bell Tel. Co., 292 Pa. Super. 24,
27-28, 436 A.2d 701, 703 (1981).
302. 768 F.2d 1204 (10th Cir. 1985).
303. Id. at 1206.
304. Id. at 1206-07.
305. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D comment a (1977).
306. Id.
307. See, e.q., Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ohio
1965); Home v. Patton, 291 Ala. 701, 287 So. 2d 824 (1973); Alberts v. Devine, 479 N.E.2d
113 (Mass. 1985); Berry v. Moench, 8 Utah 2d 191, 331 P.2d 814 (1958).
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public disclosure. ' 30 8 That judgment may be premature because many
courts continue to apply that rule stringently. 30 9
Many of the cases in which the publicity requirement has been low-
ered have involved breaches of the physician-patient privilege. 310 Some
of those cases have allowed or implied that a right of action might be
permitted against a third party who induced a breach of confidence. 31'
For example, in Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. ,312 the court
overruled the defendant insurance company's motion to dismiss. It
found that the complaint stated a right of action against the defendant
for inducing plaintiff's doctor to reveal confidential information by telling
the doctor that the plaintiff intended to name him as a defendant in a
malpractice action.313 The absence of wide publicity was not a bar to
recovery because of the nature of the relationship involved in the breach
of confidence. 314 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recently
held that a disclosure of private facts about an employee within an intra-
corporate setting is a sufficient publication, subject to a balancing test to
determine whether the communications are privileged:
In determining whether an employee's privacy right... is violated by
his physician's disclosure of personal medical data to his employer, we
would consider the degree of intrusion on privacy and the public inter-
est in preserving the confidentiality of a physician-patient relationship
balanced against the employer's need for medical information. 315
The willingness of courts to lower the publicity requirement in phy-
sician-patient cases has led one commentator to argue that courts are
moving towards a new right of action, breach of confidence. 31 6 Indeed,
that commentator argued that such a right is not limited in the same way
by the traditional defenses to the invasion of privacy. 31 7 Even if a court
rejected a new right of action for breach of confidence, in a case like Baby
Jane Doe's it may be willing to follow those courts that have allowed suit
by lowering the publicity requirement when a physician revealed confi-
308. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 112, at 857.
309. See supra note 301.
310. See supra note 307.
311. See, e.g., Alberts v. Devine, 479 N.E. 2d 113, 121 (Mass. 1985); Hammonds v. Aetna
Casualty & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
312. 243 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
313. Id.
314. Id. at 797.
315. Bratt v. International Business Mach. Corp., 467 N.E.2d 126, 137 (Mass. 1984).
316. Note, Breach of Confidence: An Emerging Tort, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1426, 1448-55
(1982). At least one court has been persuaded by this Note's argument. See, e.g., Vassiliades
v. Garfinckel's, Brooks Bros., 492 A.2d 580, 591 (D.C. 1985). But see Humphers v. First
Interstate Bank, 298 Or. 706, 717-18, 696 P.2d 527, 533-34 (1985).
317. Note, supra note 316, at 1468.
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dential information318 because of the importance of the interests involved
in confidential relationships. 319
Not all courts would agree to a lowering of the publicity require-
ment. For example, in Mikel v. Abrams 320 a physician gave his patient's
wife information regarding the patient's excessive intake of nicotine, caf-
feine, and alcohol that she used against the patient in a child custody
suit. The court concluded that the single disclosure from doctor to pa-
tient's wife was insufficient to satisfy the publication requirement, despite
an allegation that the doctor knew the information was likely to be dis-
seminated in the custody suit.321 Mikel, however, is readily distinguish-
able from cases like Baby Jane Doe's. In a custody case, the court must
apply a best interest test, making interests of the child paramount.322
Obviously, when parents are opposed to one another, parental autonomy
rights-the right of each parent to decide on behalf of the child-cannot
control because the parents' inability to agree on custody has brought the
case to court in the first place. In the problem discussed in this Article, a
state agency already has investigated the claim of abuse. Thus, the pri-
vate suitor's claim should not be entitled to the type of protection af-
forded in Mikel v. Abrams. The law should not protect an intermeddler's
right to interfere when the state itself already has determined that no
further interference with the parents' privacy is warranted.
In addition, the publicity requirement might be satisfied in a Baby
Jane Doe case because the staff member and the intermeddler were aware
that the attendant publicity almost certainly would follow commence-
ment of their suit. 323 That argument has some force, especially if it ap-
pears that the potential defendants might have been motivated by a
desire to seek the publicity for the right-to-life cause. That is, a case like
Mikel may be explained by the doctor's desire to further the interest of
the child. Publicity would be an unwanted side-effect of the breach of
confidentiality. No similar narrow construction of publicity is warranted
if a plaintiff shows that the defendant actively desired the resulting
publicity.
Thus, publicity may pose a problem in stating a right of action
318. See, e.g., Hammonds, 243 F. Supp. 793; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 652D comment a (1977) (courts may extend coverage to a simple disclosure).
319. See Note, supra note 316, at 1434.
320. 541 F. Supp. 591 (W.D. Mo. 1982), aff'd mem., 716 F.2d 907 (8th Cir. 1983).
321. Id. at 597.
322. In re Bachman v. Mejias, 1 N.Y.2d 575, 581, 136 N.E.2d 866, 869, 154 N.Y.S.2d 903,
907 (1956).
323. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D comment a (1977) (elements met if
publicity is substantially certain to follow disclosure).
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against the staff member and intermeddler. A number of arguments are
available, however, to overcome that obstacle. Depending on the circum-
stances, the defendants may have publicized the case apart from the law-
suit, thereby clearly meeting the publicity requirement. 324 Furthermore,
even absent wide publicity, a court may find that publicity is met with
communication to a small group, especially in the light of the confiden-
tial relationship between the parties. 325 The intermeddler also may be
found liable if he induces or encourages the medical staff to breach their
duty of confidence. 326 Finally, in reliance on the terms of the Restate-
ment, one might argue that the defendants knew to a substantial cer-
tainty that publicity would result from their conduct.327 Although there
is some authority suggesting a contrary result, 328 it may be possible to
distinguish it by reference to the disparity in the social utility of the de-
fendants' conduct. 329
Finally, the Restatement recognizes a defense of newsworthiness. 330
The long line of cases allowing recovery when medical facts have been
revealed demonstrates that such information is not newsworthy without
more. 33' As one court stated, "Certainly if there is any right of privacy
at all, it should include the right to obtain medical treatment at home or
in a hospital for an individual personal condition (at least if it is not
contagious or dangerous to others) without personal publicity. ' 332 The
right to privacy in medical matters is grounded on a similar utilitarian
policy, as is the doctor-patient privilege, and on the chilling effect that
publicity would have on the free flow of information between the doctor
and patient. 333 A similar interest exists when the parents, not the pa-
tient, are the appropriate decision-makers. It would be inappropriate to
324. See supra note 299 & accompanying text.
325. See supra notes 310-16 & accompanying text. Allowing an action where the informa-
tion is disseminated to a small group may be particularly appropriate when a confidential
relationship exists because of the strong policy interests that led to the creation of such a
relationship in the first place. That is, socially accepted confidential relationships should be
protected as effectively as possible. Note, supra note 316, at 1434-36.
326. See supra note 311 & accompanying text.
327. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D comment a (1977) (elements met if
publicity is substantially certain to follow).
328. See supra notes 320-21 & accompanying text.
329. See supra note 321 & accompanying text.
330. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D comment d (1977).
331. See supra notes 267-70.
332. Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 1206, 159 S.W.2d 291, 295 (1942).
333. Id. ("To enable a physician to treat his patient to advantage, it is often necessary that
the patient communicate information which it would be embarrassing and harmful to have
circulated generally throughout the community."); see also Vassiliades v. Garfinckel's, Brooks
Bros., 492 A.2d 580, 588 (D.C. 1985) (citing Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 1206, 159
S.W.2d 291, 295 (1942)).
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deter parents from seeking adequate medical care for their children by
allowing free access to facts about patients' medical conditions. 334 That
is, people are less likely to secure adequate health care if they must fear
that the physician will reveal intimate details about them. Thus, the de-
fense ought to be narrowly construed in cases involving medical care.3 35
The second Restatement states that "when the subject matter of the
publicity is of legitimate public concern, there is no invasion of pri-
vacy. ' 336 The defense of legitimate public concern is restricted mainly to
revelations by the broadcast and news media and is based on the free-
dom of the press guaranteed under the first amendment. 337 There is still
uncertainty whether the defense is available to nonmedia defendants. 338
Even assuming that the defense were available, the medical and per-
sonal information revealed in the Baby Jane Doe case probably would
not be newsworthy. Newsworthy information is not limited to facts con-
cerning public figures. Private individuals may unwittingly become
"news. '3 39 Nevertheless, whether information is newsworthy is decided
by giving "due regard to the freedom of the press and its reasonable lee-
way to choose what it will tell the public, but also due regard to the
feelings of the individual and the harm that will be done to him by the
exposure.' a4 Such analysis does not lend itself to bright lines. Whether
surgery to remove a growth on one's colon is newsworthy may depend on
whether she is President of the United States or merely a private citi-
zen. 341 Examples of private facts offered in the Restatement suggest that
most facts about one's physical condition are entitled to protection from
334. In fact, there is strong evidence that, even though authorized by federal law, Infant
Doe squads have caused disruption within hospitals, impairing effective treatment and produc-
ing consternation among parents and hospital staffs. Furthermore, the complaints that initi-
ated the squads' investigations have generally been groundless. See J. LYON, supra note 14, at
41-45. Allowing suits by strangers increases the chilling effect on parents and physicians, who
must make critical decisions in fear of a lawsuit despite the lack of merit of the suit. Infant
Doe squads may be justified under parens patriae, but private lawsuits are not.
335. Insofar as parental autonomy rights are constitutionally based, a narrow construction
is appropriate even though there are competing first amendment considerations.
336. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D comment d (1977).
337. See, e.g., Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 487-97 (1975).
338. See Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985) (Court failed to
achieve clear majority on extent to which first amendment defense is available to nonmedia
defendants in defamation cases).
339. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 652D comment e (1977); see, e.g., Jacova v.
Southern Radio & Television Co., 83 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1955); Hubbard v. Journal Publishing
Co., 69 N.M. 473, 368 P.2d 147 (1962).
340. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D comment h (1977).
341. See Note, supra note 316, at 1467 (discussing similar example as possible defense to
tort of breach of confidence); see also Hoffman, The President's Health and Privacy Issue,
Washington Post, Nat'l Weekly ed., Feb. 10, 1986, at 12.
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public view. 342 One would seem to lose privacy by reference to who one
is rather than by reference to what disease one has.343 Because of the
psychological harm caused by revelation of medical information, courts
have held that the individual's interests in privacy about medical condi-
tions outweigh the public's right to know.344
The California Supreme Court has developed a useful three-part test
to determine whether a particular event is newsworthy. To make this
finding, the court must consider "(1) the social value of the facts pub-
lished, (2) the depth of the news article's intrusion into ostensibly private
affairs, and (3) the extent to which the party voluntarily acceded to a
position of public notoriety. '345
The California test depends on the circumstances of a given case.346
Concededly, there is some social value in information about care of
newborns. But in the Baby Jane Doe case, the parents did not, in effect,
consent to notoriety. Although they appeared on television, 347 they did
so months after Washburn had made them a subject of public scrutiny.
As observed by the New York Court of Appeals, Washburn sought ex-
tensive intrusion into the case, by attempting to "catapult [himself] into
the very heart of a family circle, there to challenge the most private and
most precious responsibility vested in the parents for the care and nur-
342. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D comment b, illustration 7
(1977) (invasion of privacy to show photograph of deformed infant); id. comment c, illustra-
tion 10 (highly offensive to show picture of mother nursing her infant); id. comment e, illustra-
tion 11 (highly offensive to show film of cesarian section). But see id. comment f, illustration
15 (not invasion of privacy to publish report about 12-year-old who gives birth).
343. Id. comment f (listing instances of person involuntarily becoming news).
344. See, e.g., Vassiliades v. Garfinckel's, Brooks Bros., 492 A.2d 580, 580-89 (D.C. 1985);
Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, 139 Cal. App. 3d 118, 133-35, 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 772-73 (1983).
Although not dispositive, New York state law permits the public to be excluded from abuse
hearings pursuant to the Family Court Act. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1043 (McKinney 1983).
According to commentary to that section, "the general public is routinely and automatically
excluded from every hearing." Id. comment to § 1043. In this act, the New York legislature
has effectively balanced public and private rights. See Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 60 N.Y.2d
208, 209, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 1187, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63, 64 (1983) (Family Court Act was designed
to balance interests of parents, infant, and the state).
345. Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 4 Cal. 3d 529, 541, 483 P.2d 34, 43, 93 Cal. Rptr.
866, 875 (1971) (citing Kapellas v. Kofman, I Cal. 3d 20, 36, 459 P.2d 912, 922, 81 Cal. Rptr.
360, 370 (1969)).
346. For example, in Briscoe the court observed that several factors were relevant to
whether a jury found revelation of private facts newsworthy, including whether the individ-
ual's identity in connection with incidents of his past life has significant social value and
whether an individual has reverted to an unexciting life after the events that led to public
attention initially. Id.; see also Roshto v. Hebert, 439 So. 2d 428 (La. 1983) (listing factors to
be considered).
347. 60 Minutes, supra note 37.
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ture of their children. ' 348 Thus, a court applying the California test for
newsworthiness might appropriately weigh the relevant factors in favor
of the parents.
Thus, though this Article concedes that a seriously ill newborn can-
not state a cause of action against an intermeddler,349 it argues that her
parents can do so. For purposes of section 652B, the parents must prove
that a defendant intentionally intruded upon their seclusion or private
affairs and that this type of intrusion is highly offensive to a reasonable
person.350 Proving intent in a case like that of Baby Jane Doe will not be
difficult. The intermeddler intends to change the course of medical treat-
ment selected by the parents. 351 Courts recognize a state interest to in-
quire and sometimes to intervene in decisions made by parents on behalf
of their children.352 But absent a sufficient state interest, the parents'
decision is their private affair. Although not controlling, parental rights
have constitutional roots, a fact that should inform a court considering
the interest intruded upon. Finally, the parents must prove the offensive
nature of the intrusion.353 This Article has cited other cases involving
intrusion in the medical context 354 and the public response to the Baby
Jane Doe case 355 to demonstrate that intermeddling in such cases is con-
sidered highly offensive. The advantage of pursuing an action under sec-
tion 652B is the unavailability of a defense of newsworthiness. 356 The
parents also must show damages. For a case under section 652B, they
would have to show harm suffered from the deprivation of their seclusion
or freedom from intrusion in making a decision on behalf of their in-
fant.357 Arguably, this would include legal fees necessitated by the intru-
sion: that is, those fees the parents incurred in order to retain their right
to make a medical treatment choice on behalf of their infant.358 A sec-
ond area of damages, potentially quite substantial, is mental distress that
normally would result from such an intrusion. 359
348. Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 60 N.Y.2d 208, 213, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 1188, 469
N.Y.S.2d 63, 65 (1983).
349. See supra notes 132-91 & accompanying text.
350. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
351. As with the Baby Jane Doe case, the intermeddler may be quite willing to try his case
in the public forum, making proof of intent quite simple. See 60 Minutes, supra note 37.
352. See supra notes 217-33 & accompanying text.
353. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
354. See supra notes 267-70 & accompanying text.
355. See supra note 28.
356. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B comment a (1977).
357. Id. § 652H(a) & (c).
358. These fees were quite substantial. See 60 Minutes, supra note 37, at 6.
359. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652H(b) (1977). For some evidence of the
parents' emotional harm in the Baby Jane Doe case, see 60 Minutes, supra note 37.
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Less certain is the availability of an action under section 652D. A
plaintiff must show that a defendant "gives publicity to a matter concern-
ing the [plaintiffs] private life ... [and] the matter publicized is of a kind
that.., would be highly offensive to a reasonable person and.., is not of
legitimate concern to the public. ' 360 It seems beyond cavil that revealing
facts about parental decision-making gives publicity to a matter concern-
ing the parents' private life. 361 As with section 652B, the plaintiff should
show that such a revelation is highly offensive to reasonable people. Sec-
tion 652D requires a showing that the information is not of legitimate
concern to the public, and that has proven to be the most difficult issue
under that section. 362 The balancing test developed to resolve the news-
worthiness question arguably tilts in favor of the parents in a case like
that of Baby Jane Doe.363 The damages received under section 652D
also may be less substantial than an action under section 652B. Damages
for mental distress would be equally available. 364 The additional ele-
ment of damages, harm to reputation, 365 may be relatively meager. 366
Conclusion
The Baby Jane Doe367 case has captured considerable attention and
produced extensive commentary. Much of the commentary has been
critical of private and governmental efforts to intervene. 368 Implicit in the
commentary was the assumption that privacy rights had been invaded.
This Article has attempted to examine that assumption and to determine
whether private conduct by an officious intermeddler is actionable in
cases such as Baby Jane Doe's. Case law does not answer the question.
The privacy action continues to evolve, however, and should provide a
much-needed remedy.
Section 652B of the second Restatement of Torts369 protects an indi-
vidual from interference with solitude or seclusion, not only to his per-
son, but also to his private affairs. This Article contends that Baby Jane
Doe's parents and others like them should have a legally protected inter-
360. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
361. Cf id. comment b (citing family quarrels and many unpleasant illnesses as examples
of private facts).
362. See supra notes 332-67 & accompanying text.
363. See supra notes 346-49 & accompanying text.
364. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652H(b) (1977).
365. Id. § 652H(a).
366. This is especially true in light of much of the press being sympathetic to the parents.
See supra note 28; 60 Minutes, supra note 37.
367. For a discussion of the case, see supra notes 48-84 & accompanying text.
368. See supra note 28.
369. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B comment a (1977).
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est in making treatment decisions for their newborn. That interest is
constitutionally protected against unwarranted governmental invasion.
Although not controlling in an action against a private citizen, the con-
stitutional authority for such a privacy right demonstrates that it is wor-
thy of protection. Properly analyzed, a court could easily find that an
intermeddler, such as the attorney Washburn in the Baby Jane Doe case,
intentionally intruded on the parents' decision-making autonomy.
Section 652D of the second Restatement 370 also provides authority
for a right of action against intermeddlers like Washburn. He and his
cohort within the hospital succeeded in giving publicity to a matter con-
cerning the private lives of Baby Jane Doe's parents. 371 For a time, the
nation was riveted on whether the parents would consent to surgery for
their seriously ill newborn. Publicity was the foreseeable consequence of
Washburn's efforts. Although the public was interested in those private
facts, if the facts were improperly revealed the defendants may not nec-
essarily be able to invoke a newsworthiness defense. On balance, that
defense should be rejected in such a case.
This Article does not argue for a new right of action.372 Instead, it
analyzes the Baby Jane Doe case in light of established precedent and
suggests that a court need not depart from the current law to recognize
the parents' right of action against an intermeddler. Such a right of ac-
tion is especially appropriate in a case like Baby Jane Doe's when the
state has established procedures to balance and protect the interests of
the infant against the interests of the parents. The law should not protect
private interference into the parents' personal lives once the state has
determined that the parents' treatment decision should be respected. As
medical treatment decisions become more complex, 373 we may see more
instances in which an individual like Washburn will engage in his own
brand of civil disobedience, spurred on by his personal moral vision.374
Such individuals may resort to personal harassment, as has occurred at
abortion clinics,375 or to improper use of the court system. Whatever the
370. Id. § 652D.
371. Id.
372. But see Note, supra note 316 (arguing that courts are recognizing a cause of action for
breach of confidentiality).
373. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985) (court established three
separate tests to determine whether nutrition and hydration could be withdrawn from a senile
patient); see also authority cited supra note 89 (critical of withdrawal of support in such
cases).
374. See supra notes 85-110 & accompanying text.
375. See C. PAIGE, supra note 42, at 75-76.
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form of invasion, tort law ought to redress such abuses and vindicate the
rights of privacy and personal choice.
